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WHERE ANTITRUST ENDS AND IP BEGINS - ON THE
ROOTS OF THE TRANSATLANTIC CLASHES
KATARZYNA A. CZAPRACKA
ABSTRACT
U.S. antitrust enforcers see little scope for antitrust policy to mitigate the
consequences of imperfect IP policies. They are reluctant to intervene in
what is perceived to be the sphere of IP policy and take the view that any
competitive concerns are better remedied by changes in the IP policy. This
trend corresponds with shielding antitrust policy away from fields occupied
by other forms of regulation. Exactly the opposite tendencies are present in
EU competition law. Both the European Commission and the ECJ seem to
see a role for competition law to correct improvidently defined IPRs, even if
it entails adjusting competition principles. It may seem reasonable, as
unlike competition policy, most issues relating to IP policy within the
European Union are still decided at the national level. Yet, there is an
inherent danger in this approach. It may lead antitrust authorities to adopt
analytically questionable approaches that undermine the coherence of
antitrust law. Competition agencies must be particularly cautious in
adopting the measures to curb IP laws, as they may discourage private R&D
investment. The Commission's views on application of Article 82 to
interoperability information, as expressed in the Microsoft Decision and the
Article 82 Paper, confirm that these reservations are valid.
Friedman Fellow, JSD Candidate, Columbia Law School. Warm thanks are expressed to
Professors Petros Mavroidis and Harvey J. Goldschmid for their guidance and insightful
comments on the paper.
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INTRODUCTION
Antitrust authorities on both sides of the Atlantic agree that, in
principle, the ultimate objective of antitrust regulation is to enhance
consumer welfare.' As the U.S. Supreme Court explains the goal is "not to
protect businesses from the working of the market; it is to protect the public
from the failure of the market." 2  Market mechanisms are not always
sufficient to ensure that dominant companies do not preempt the
competitive process. To remedy this problem, §2 of the Sherman Act
makes it illegal to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade and commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations".
Similarly, Article 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community
(EC Treaty) prohibits "any abuse by one or more undertakings of a
dominant position within the common market." 3 The Commission,
however, does not go as far as to acknowledge that consumer welfare is the
exclusive goal of antitrust policy.4 When considering whether efficiencies
as a defense to anticompetitive conduct, the Commission expressly states
that "[u]ltimately the protection of rivalry and the competitive process is
given priority over possible pro-competitive efficiency gains."
Monopolization under §2 of the Sherman Act or abuse of a dominant
position under Article 82 of the EC Treaty comprises two elements:
possession of market power and anticompetitive conduct. Yet, there is little
convergence between the European and American law of monopolization.
The differences concern such fundamental issues as the definition of
dominance, the assessment of what constitutes anticompetitive conduct, or
the requirement of a causal link between maintenance of monopoly power
and anticompetitive conduct. But perhaps the most fundamental difference
lies in the philosophy behind the European and American law of
monopolization. As Advocate General Jacobs noted in Bronner, whereas
§2 of the Sherman Act is designed to protect competition by prohibiting the
1 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (holding that the Congress designed
the Sherman Act as a consumer welfare prescription).
2 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458, (1993). The Court continuing:
"the law directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but
against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself. It does so not out of
solicitude for private concerns but out of concern for the public interest." Id.
The European Commission expressly acknowledges that the objective of Article 82 is the
protection of competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of
ensuring efficient allocation of resources. European Commission, DG Discussion Paper on
the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf.
4 See Brian A. Facey & Dany H. Assaf, Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance in
Canada, the United States, and the European Union: A Survey, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 513
(2002) (discussing the objectives of antitrust laws across jurisdictions); Eleanor M. Fox,
What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive Effect, 70
ANTITRUST L.J. 371 (2002).
2006-2007
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acquisition or maintenance of "monopoly power ", Article 82 is used to
regulate the actions of companies in "dominant positions ".5 As it will be
shown below, less market power is required to find that a company has a
dominant position than it is required to establish that it has monopoly
power.
These differences have a bearing on the obligations of dominant
companies controlling essential inputs, including intellectual property (IP),
to share those inputs with rivals. There have been virtually no decisions
condemning a unilateral refusal to license of a valid intellectual property
right (IPR) in the United States. By contrast, in the European Union (EU),
IP may be treated as an essential facility and courts and competition
authorities may request that a dominant company shares its IP with
competitors. Yet, this is only a part of the story of antitrust and IP law
intersection in the transatlantic context. The less discussed but equally
important part is the relation between antitrust law and regulation that may
disrupt competitive processes. In unregulated markets, competition
enforcement is necessary to address specific market failures. In regulated
markets, competition law may also be used to address externalities created
by regulatory activity. Patents, copyrights, trade marks, trade secrets and
other forms of IP give their owners some exclusivity over a particular way
in which a piece of information can be used or expressed. Enforcement
agencies and commentators agree that IPRs combined with market power
may give rise to competitive concerns. Unwarranted or overly broad IPRs
not only harm competition in the short run, but also harm innovation in the
longer run. In this context, the question whether antitrust enforcers see the
role for antitrust as being to curb IPRs, when they are used to forestall
innovation is particularly interesting. The analysis of the relevant case law
points to the conclusion that EU competition law is applied to remedy the
consequences of imperfect IP laws. In contrast, the U.S. antitrust agencies
and courts note flaws in the IP system, but are much more reserved when it
comes to remedying their negative effects; instead they defer such problems
to the authorities responsible for IP policy. Application of antitrust rules to
address imperfections in IP laws might offer significant advantages, in
particular taken that IP policy makers often do not take due account of
competition values. Yet, it has also dangerous implications. As the EU
experience shows, the reasoning that leads to desirable outcomes in a
particular case may create a danger of over-enforcement and negatively
affect incentives to innovate if applied to valid IPRs. 6 The challenge lies in
5 See Opinion of AG Jacobs in Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs-
und Zeitschriflenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschafl mbH
& Co. KG and Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschafl mbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791,
46.
6 Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd. (ITP) v.
Commission [hereinafter Magill] 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, 15-16. The first case decided by the
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the coining of clear limiting principles for application of antitrust laws to
IPRs.
The paper starts with an overview of antitrust principles applicable
to unilateral conduct of dominant companies in the EU and in the U.S. to set
field for the discussion. The second section discusses how these general
principles have been applied to bottleneck monopolies. This issue is highly
relevant for the discussion of the intersection between IP and antitrust, as
the essential facilities doctrine forms a framework for curbing overbroad
IPRs in the EU. The third section addresses application of antitrust
principles to distortions created by sectoral regulation in the two
jurisdictions. It traces how these principles influenced application of
antitrust principles to IPRs in the EU and in the U.S. The antitrust principles
applicable to unilateral conduct involving IP laws are the subject of the
fourth section, which reviews the relevant case law and shows that the EU
antitrust authorities, unlike their U.S. counterparts use antitrust to address
flaws in the IP system. Conclusions follow.
I. MONOPOLIZATION AND ABUSE OF DOMINANCE: COWBOY CAPITALISM
AND GENTLEMEN COMPETITION?
The law of monopolization is a highly controversial field, both in
Europe and in the United States. The American commentators are currently
digesting the Supreme Court's decision in Trinko,7 which seems to have
significantly limited the scope for antitrust intervention under §2 of the
Sherman Act. 8 In response to the criticism that European rules on abuse ofdominance lack consistency and economic rigor,9 the European
European Court of Justice (ECJ) where a compulsory license was ordered as a remedy. See
in particular Opinion of AG Gulmann.
' Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398
(2004).
8 See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Is There Life in Aspen After Trinko? The Silent Revolution of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 153 (2005); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147 (2005); John Thorne, A
Categorical Rule Limiting Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Verizon v Trinko, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 289 (2005); Thomas E. Kauper, Section Two of the Sherman Act: The Search for
Standards, 93 GEO. L.J. 1623 (2005).
9 See, e.g., John Temple Lang, Anticompetitive Non-Pricing Abuses Under European and
National Antitrust Law in BARRY HAWK(ED), FORDHAM CORPORATE L. INSTITUTE 235
(2003); Thomas Eilmansberger, How to Distinguish Goodfrom Bad Competition under
Article 82 EC: In Search of Clearer and More Coherent Standards for Anti-Competitive
Abuses, 42 COMMON MARKET. L REV. 129 (2005); Damien Geradin, Limiting the Scope of
Article 82 EC: What Can the EULearn from the U.S. Supreme Court's Judgment in Trinko
in the Wake of Microsoft, IMS, and Deutsche Telekom?, 41 COMMON MARKET L. REV.
1519 (2004); Derek Ridyard, Compulsory Access under EU Competition Law - A New
Doctrine of "Convenient Facilities " and the Case for Price Regulation, 25 EUR.
COMPETITION L. REV. 669 (2004); Brian Sher, The Last of the Steam Powered Trains:
Modernizing Article 82, 25 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 243 (2004); John Kallaugher &
Brian Sher, Rebates Revisited: Anti-Competitive Effects and Exclusionary Abuse Under
2006-2007
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Commission published the Article 82 Paper 10 with the aim to clarify and
reform European antitrust rules applicable to unilateral conduct. The
document presents the Commission's views on the standards for assessing
abuse of a dominant position. It may be the first step in making the
application of Article 82 less formalistic and more in line with modern
economic thought. In some instances, particular recommendations
advanced in the Discussion Paper do not correspond to the established
principles of EU law on abuse of a dominant position. The Discussion
Paper and the public consultations which will be held in the spring of 2006
may be turned into guidelines on Article 82 enforcement.
The dissatisfaction with law of monopolization is perhaps the only
common ground for commentators across the jurisdictions. I There seems
to be little convergence between U.S. and EU antitrust rules applicable to
unilateral conduct. Some of the decisions taken in Europe were subject to
severe criticism in the U.S. A senior U.S. antitrust official commented on
the European Commission's decision in Microsoft that it was "protecting
competitors, not competition, in ways that may ultimately harm innovation
and the consumers that benefit from it". 12  Shortly after, another U.S.
official suggested that whereas the U.S. system supports "cowboy
capitalism", allowing monopolist to compete aggressively on the merits
even if it entails injuries to its rivals, the Europeans require dominant firms
to "compete like gentlemen". 13 Sections 1.1.-1.3. offer some insights into
these divergences. They are not a comprehensive comparative study of
Article 82, 25 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 263 (2004); John Temple Lang & Robert
O' Donoghue, The Concept of Exclusionary Abuse, GCLC Research Paper on Article 82,
(2005),
http://www.coleurop.be/content/gclc/documents/GCLC / 20Research / 20Papers / 2 0 on / 2
OArticle%2082%20EC.pdf.
10 See European Commission, Directorate General for Competition, DG Competition
discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses
[hereinafter: Article 82 Paper], Dec. 19 2005,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf.
" See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV.
253 (2003); John Temple Lang & Robert O'Donoghue, The Concept of an Exclusionary
Abuse under Article 82 EC; Robert Pitofsky, Past, Present, and Future of Antitrust
Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 209 (2005) (comparing
to other fields of antitrust where there is more agreement as to the applicable standards);
supra note 9 and accompanying text.
12 Press Release, Department of Justice, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, R. Hewitt
Pate, Issues Statement on the EC's Decision in its Microsoft Investigation,
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/March/04 at 184.htm.
13 See J. Bruce McDonald, Section 2 and Article 82: Cowboys and Gentlemen, the
Modernisation of Article Speech at Article 82 Second Annual Conference, Brussels,
Belgium (June 16-17, 2005); Mario Monti, Comments to the Speech of Hew Pate, Antitrust
in a Transatlantic Context, Brussels, Belgium (June 7, 2004) at Article 82 Second Annual
Conference, Brussels, Belgium (June 16-17, 2005); see also R. Hewitt Pate, Antitrust in a
Transatlantic context From the Cicada's Perspective Address at Article 82 Second
Annual Conference, Brussels, Belgium (June 16-17, 2005).
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monopolization law in the two jurisdictions, but offer some observations
which may be helpful for understanding how American and European
antitrust enforcers approach competitive concerns resulting from the
combination of IP and market power.
A. MONOPOLY POWER
In principle, unilateral conduct gives rise to competitive concerns
only if it is undertaken by a company with a significant degree of market.
The theory goes that if there are substitutes on the market, no company can
raise prices substantially above competitive level without loosing market
shares to its rivals. A monopolist has power over prices and can engage in
exclusionary conduct. 14 Monopoly power was defined by the U.S. Supreme
Court as "the power to raise prices and exclude competition." 15 Along the
same lines, the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) definition of the
dominance refers to possession of economic power in a relevant market
"which enables [a company] to prevent effective competition being
maintained in the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and
ultimately of its consumers."16
The conventional proxy for market power is the defendant's share of
the relevant market. In the U.S., market shares in the range of 70%-90% are
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of monopoly power, provided that
they are held over a significant period of time. 17 A company that does not
possess significant market power at the time of anticompetitive conduct
may still violate § 2 if it obtains monopoly power as a result of that conduct.
If the conduct does not result in a monopoly power, the company may be
guilty of attempted monopolization. 18 The classic formulation of attempted
monopolization requires that three elements are present 1) a predatory or
anticompetitive conduct, 2) an intent to monopolize, and 2) a dangerously
14 See Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Microsoft Corporation, 253 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (demonstrating that a firm
which has taken such actions indicates that it has monopoly power); William E. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 956-57
(1981); see also Elhauge, supra note 11, at 257-59.
15 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992).
16 See United Brands v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 65; Hoffman La-Roche v.
Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 461, 38-39.
17 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d. Cir. 1945) (holding
that a market share of 90% was "enough to constitute a monopoly", and that it was
"doubtful whether 60 or 64 percent would be enough and certainly 33 percent is not.") See,
e.g., Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 54-55; United States v. Dentsply International, Inc., 399 F.3d
181, 188 (3d Cir. 2005).
18 See PHILIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 802 (2002).
2006-2007
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high probability of achieving monopoly power. 19 In Spectrum Sports, the
Supreme Court stressed that the dangerous probability of success could not
be inferred from conduct alone.2 0 Demonstrating the dangerous probability
of monopolization in an attempt case requires inquiry into the relevant
product and geographic market and the defendant's economic power in that
market. 2 1 The defendant does not need to have present monopoly power,
but its position on the market must be sufficiently close to monopoly that
the conduct threatens to bring about monopolization.22  There is a
presumption that attempt does not occur in the absence of a significant
market share. 23
Article 82 does not distinguish between monopolization and an
attempt to monopolize. Only companies which dominate a particular
market at the time when the alleged abuse started may be charged with an
Article 82 violation. A dominant company has the power to prevent
effective competition and to act independently on the market.2 4 Seemingly,
these concepts are akin to the U.S. Supreme Court's definition of the
monopoly power as excessive power over prices or the ability to exclude
competition.25 The power to prevent effective competition can be equated
with the power to engage in exclusionary conduct. The ability to act
independently on the market has been defined as the ability to restrict
output and raise prices significantly above the competitive level2 6 Yet, it
'9 See e.g., Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905); Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153-55 (1951); United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416,
431-32 (2d Cir. 1945); Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1993).
20 Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 459 (holding that anticompetitive conduct may be sufficient
to prove the necessary intent to monopolize). Professors Areeda & Hovenkamp suggest
that in the light of this judgment specific intent to monopolize is largely irrelevant in
defining the attempted monopolization offense. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP supra note 18,
at 804.
21 Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 459.
22 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 807a.
23 See id. (discussing the trend in recent decisions to impose significant minimum market
share requirements on the attempt offense); H.L. Hayden Co. of N.Y. v. Siemens Medical
Sys., 879 F.2d 1005 (2d. Cir. 1989); see also Cohen v. Primerica Corp., 709 F. Supp. 63,
66 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); International Logistics Group v. Chrysler Corp., 1988-2 Trade Cas.
P68, 127 (E.D. Mich.), affd, 884 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066
(1990); Bacchus Indus. v. Arvin Indus., 939 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1991).
24 See Hoffman La-Roche, 1978 E.C.R. 461, 38-39 (discussing the power to prevent
effective competition is the power to engage in exclusionary conduct. The ability to act
independent on the market has been interpreted as the ability to restrict output and raise
prices above the competitive level thereby enjoying increased profits).
21 See, e.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956);
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992).
26 See Article 82 Paper, supra note 10, at 21-24 (referring to the influence over prices and
other "parameters of competition" such as output, innovation, and the variety of goods and
services. Higher than "normal" profits may be the evidence of dominance); see also id., at
26; United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 126, and Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden
8
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appears that companies with less market power can be charged with an
abuse of dominance than it would be required for monopolization under §2
of the Sherman Act. In United Brands, a company with a market share
between 40 and 45% was sufficient to establish dominance. Though it is
unlikely, even a company holding less than 40% of the relevant market can
be found dominant. 27 What is more, dominance is more likely to be found
on the basis of market share alone, whereas in the US other factors may be
more important in the assessment of the market power. In AKZO, the ECJ
held that a market share of 50% could be considered very large so that, in
the absence of exceptional circumstances a company with such a market
share would be presumed dominant.28 The Article 82 Paper advocates a
more flexible approach. The Commission takes the view that a company is
only "likely" to be dominant when it has been holding 50% or more of the
relevant market for some time and its rivals have substantially smaller
market shares.29 It also stresses that market share is "only a proxy for
market power" 30 and that other factors, such as barriers to entry, need to be
considered.31
Some authority points to the conclusion that there may be different
degrees of dominance. Companies having extremely high market shares
leading to a "super-dominant" position may be subject to stricter liability
for exclusionary behavior. 32 In the Article 82 Paper, the Commission
advocates the view that "the degree of dominance may be relevant for
Industrie Michelin v Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, 59; see also RICHARD WHISH,
COMPETITION LAW 179-180 (2005).
27 See 92 Gottrup-Klim and others Grovvareforeninger v. Dansk Landbrugs
Grovvareselskab, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5641 (discussing the role a company with a market shares
in the range of 32-36% was found dominant. The Article 82 Paper suggests that the cut-off
market share is in the range of 25%).
21 See Case C-62/86 AKZO v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 1-3359.
29 See Article 82 Paper, supra note 10, at 31.
30 [d. at 32.
31 [d. at 34.
32 See e.g., Opinion of AG Fennelly in Cases C-395 & 396/96 P Compagnie Maritime
Beige Transports SA and others v. Commission, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1365, 119; (declaring that
the position of "overwhelming dominance verging on monopoly" would give rise to
"particularly onerous special obligations" not to interfere with competitive process. The
Commission referred to this line of case law in Clearstream (Commission Decision in case
COMP/38.096 Clearstream, 300) and in Microsoft (Commission Decision in case
COMP/37.792 - Microsoft, 435)); see also Ivo VAN BALL & JEAN-FRANCOIS BELLIS,
COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 119 (2005); ALISON JONES & BRENDA
SUFRIN, EC COMPETITION LAW 235 (2002); DAMIEN GERADIN, PAUL HOFER, FREDERIC
LouIs, NICOLAS PETIT & MIKE WALKER, THE CONCEPT OF DOMINANCE, GCLC RESEARCH
PAPERS ON ARTICLE 82 EC - JULY 2005, AT
www.coleurop.be/content/gclc/documents/GCLC%/o20Research%/o20Papers%/o20on%/o20Artic
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finding abuse." 33 The position of super-dominance is likely to be found
when a company has market shares in excess of 75% and there is almost no
competition from other actual competitors in the market.34 Yet, until the
EU Courts explicitly embrace the concept of super-dominance, its validity
will remain uncertain.
B. MONOPOLY POWER AND IP
Market power cannot be inferred from the ownership of IPRs
alone. 35 There is a difference between the exclusive rights granted by IPRs
and the monopoly power that is the concern of antitrust law. Even if
patented, it is likely that the product will have many substitutes in the
market, some of which may be protected by IPRs. Similarly, the fact that
the owner of an IPR may be able to charge a price higher than the marginal
cost does not mean that she enjoys monopoly power, as there is usually a
high sunk cost involved in the development of a new product. Yet under
certain circumstances, IPRs may enhance market power and create barriers
to entry. Barriers to entry are generally defined as factors that allow
incumbent companies earn supra-competitive returns without attracting
entry.36 A patent, for example, may be a barrier to entry if it controls the
only available technology. 37  In a market of differentiated products, a
33 See Article 82 Paper, supra note 10, at 59. The relevant section provides "In general, the
higher the capability of conduct to foreclose and the wider its application and the stronger
dominant position, the higher the likelihood that an anticompetitive foreclosure results. In
view of these sliding scales, where in the following sections various factors are used to
indicate circumstances under which a likely foreclosure effect is considered to occur with
high(er) or low(er) likelihood, it needs to be kept in mind that these descriptions can not be
applied mechanically."
34 [d. at 92.
35 See, e.g., 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 703; 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET
AL, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4.1-4.2. (2002); Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or
Property Rights?, 8 RES. L. & EcON. 31 (1986); Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and
Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of 1P, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1729-30 (2000);
Simone A. Rose, Patent Monopolyphobia: A Means of Extinguishing the Fountainhead?,
49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 509 (1999).
36 36 See 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 420a. The European Commission
defines barriers to entry as "factors that make entry impossible or unprofitable while
permitting established undertakings to charge prices above competitive level." Article 82
Paper, supra note 10, at 38; see also, Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON.
REV. 47 (1982); David Harbord & Tom Hoehn, Barriers to Entry and Exit in European
Competition Policy, 14 INT'L REV. L. AND ECON. 411 (1994); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE
ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of
Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 929-31 (1979) (advocating a narrower definition
of the barriers to entry).
37 See Article 82 Paper, supra note 10, at 40. The European Commission also considers
absolute cost-advantages, including access to innovation, R&D and intellectual property as
barriers to entry.
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defendant's product might enjoy a price-cost advantage that rivals cannot
eliminate because patents, trademarks, or other factors prevent them from
duplicating the defendant's version of the product.
Antirust agencies in Europe and in the U.S. concur that IP does not
confer market power, 38 and that the relevant market to be taken into account
in the antitrust enquiry is that of alternative technologies and artistic
offerings that are available or likely to be created, i.e. the range of available
substitutes.39 In Magill, the ECJ indicated that the mere ownership of an
IPR does not confer a dominant position.40 In the Article 82 Paper, the
Commission confirms that "intellectual property rights do not as such
confer dominance on the holder." 41 Until recently, the issue was less clear
in America. In a rather dated stream of case law, the U.S. Supreme Court
created a presumption of monopoly power in tying cases, where the tying
product was patented or covered by copyrights. 42 This line of case law has
been finally abrogated in Independent Ink, where the Supreme Court held
that the fact that a tying product is patented does not support the
presumption of market power in a patented product.
43
Whether or not monopoly power is inferred from IPRs, the key issue
is the definition of a relevant market. If the relevant market is defined
narrowly so that it includes solely the product covered by an IPR, the IP
31 See U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing
of Intellectual Property (April 6, 1995), at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.pdf, 2.2 [hereinafter U.S. Licensing
Guidelines]; The Commission Notice - Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the
EC Treaty to technology transfer agreements, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 2, 16-17 (discussing the
need to assess the degree of market power in the relevant market) [hereinafter EU
Guidelines on the Transfer of Technology]; Article 82 Paper, supra note 10, at 40.
39 See The U.S. Licensing Guidelines, 3.2; EU Guidelines on the Transfer of Technology,
supra note 38, 19-25. The American and European antitrust agencies identify three
markets that need to be taken into account in the application of antitrust law to IPRs: the
market for products or services covered by the technology subject to IP protection, the
market for the technology and the market for research and development (innovation
markets).
40 See Magill, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, 46-47. In this case the Commission and the CFI based its
finding of dominance on both, the de facto monopoly over the copyrighted subject matter
and the legal monopoly stemming from the copyright. The ECJ did not even mention the
legal monopoly in its discussion of dominance.
41 See supra note 38.
42 United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (holding that "The requisite
economic power is presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted"); United
States v. Times-Picayune Pub. Co., 345 U.S. 594, 608 (1953) (holding that patents confer
monopolistic, albeit lawful, market control); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 1312 (1948) (holding that there is a presumption that copyrights confer market
power); Int'l Salt Co, Inc. v. G.S. Suppinger Co., 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (holding that there is
a presumption that patents confer market power). In a more recent decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court confirmed the presumption in dicta. Jefferson Parish Hospital District No.
2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984). The concurring Justices concluded that there should be
no such presumption. Id. at 38.
43 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 126 St. Ct. 1281 (2006).
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holder will always be dominant. 44 This was the case for example in Magill,
45 where the ECJ rejected the possibility that dominance could be inferred
from possession of copyright, but accepted a very narrow definition of the
market, basically coinciding with the copyrighted subject-matter. Similarly,
the Supreme Court found that a single brand of product or service can be
"relevant market" under Sherman Act prohibition against monopolization. 46
C. ABUSIVE CONDUCT
The differences in the assessment of monopoly power shed some
light on the "two systems of belief about monopoly", but the definition of
anticompetitive conduct is more telling. Neither in the U.S., nor in Europe
is the mere possession of significant market power ipso facto sufficient for
finding violation of antitrust laws. Both jurisdictions demand also
anticompetitive conduct on part of the dominant company.
U.S. antitrust law prohibits exclusionary or anticompetitive conduct.
If the notion of "exclusionary conduct" is interpreted literally, it denotes
conduct that makes it more difficult for rivals to enter the monopolist's
market or to increase their output.4 7 However, there is an understanding
that only those unreasonably exclusionary practices that also reduce social
welfare merit antitrust intervention. As the DC Circuit Court explained in
Microsoft "[w]hether any particular act of a monopolist is exclusionary,
rather than merely a form of vigorous competition, can be difficult to
discern: the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate
competition, are myriad. The challenge for an antitrust court lies in stating a
general rule for distinguishing between exclusionary acts, which reduce
social welfare, and competitive acts, which increase it." 48  The classic
formulation of abusive conduct requires showing that 1) the conduct is
reasonably capable of creating, enlarging or prolonging monopoly power by
impairing the opportunities of rivals; and 2) it is not reasonably necessary to
achieve any consumer gains that the conduct promises.49 The focus of this
44 See generally M. Howard Morse, Product Market Definition in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 633 (2003).
45 See Case T-69/89 RTE v. Commission 1991 E.C.R. 11-485 (upheld on appeal by the
E.C.J. in joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v. Commission, 1995
E.C.R. 1-743).
46 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481-82 (1992).
47 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Monopolization Qffence, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1035-37 (2000).
48 See supra note 14; see also Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458-59
(1993), (commenting that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust competition from
conduct with long-term anticompetitive effects; moreover, single-firm activity is unlike
concerted activity covered by § 1, which "inherently is fraught with anti-competitive risk).
49 See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 651A; see also United States v.
Microsoft Corp. 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (2001) (ruling that it was appropriate to balance
harmful conduct against its efficiency enhancing effects).
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test is efficiency.50 Proving monopolization also requires showing that the
improper practices made or were likely to have made a contribution to the
defendant's monopoly power.51
The focus on efficiency is the legacy of the Chicago School of Law
and Economics, which revolutionized antitrust by applying price theory to
the analysis of practices considered illegal under antitrust rules and by
shielding antitrust law away from industrial policies. The Chicago scholars
showed that many unilateral practices condemned as anticompetitive under
§2 create efficiencies. In particular, the leverage theory of tying, hostility
against vertical integration, and exaggerated notions of monopolization that
failed to ask whether the defendant monopolized anything that was even
capable of being monopolized were the subject of severe criticism.5 2 The
Chicago School stressed the risk of error, the cost of condemning practices
that are in fact beneficial for consumers,5 3 as well as the difficulties in
designing antitrust remedies so that are feasible to administer and enhance
consumer welfare in a way that is superior to market mechanisms.5 4 There
was a belief that the competitive is robust and that market mechanisms can
protect themselves better than it could be achieved by means of government
intervention. Hence, the prescription that antitrust should target little or
nothing aside from hardcore cartels and mergers to monopoly.55 Although
the pro-market and largely anti-government Chicago School approach had
50 See Eilhauge, supra note 11, at 315-16. Professor Eilhauge focused on a slightly
different test involving the proper monopolization standard which should focus on whether
the alleged exclusionary conduct succeeds in furthering monopoly power 1) if the
monopolist has improved its own efficiency or 2) by impairing rival efficiency whether or
not it enhances monopolist efficiency. He proposed that the first category of conduct
should be per se legal whereas the second should be per se illegal. Professor Eilhauge's test
does not focus on balancing between the monopolist's efficiency gains and the
anticompetitive harm. The question asked is whether the principal cause for enhancing
monopoly power is an increase in economic efficiency of the monopolist or a decrease in
rival's efficiency.
51 See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 806; Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1991) (holding monopolization occurs when a
company foregoes its short-term profits in expectation of reaping benefits by exercising
monopoly power in long-term. Such conduct is deemed anticompetitive if it is capable of
excluding from defendant's market an equally or more efficient competitor); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 194-96 (2d ed. 2001).
52 See generally ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
(1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976).
53 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 52; Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1 (1984).
54 See, e.g., William M. Landes,, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 652 (1983); Abbott B. Lipsky & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1187, 1188 (1999).
55 See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Retrospective and Perspective:
Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, in HARRY FIRST ET AL.,
REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY 2 (1991); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Policy after Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985).
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significant and lasting consequences for the US antitrust analysis, only
some of its postulates were accepted in mainstream antitrust analysis. It has
been pointed out that markets can be anticompetitive in a variety of
circumstances that Chicago economists disregarded. Since the 1990s, the
task of antitrust enforcers has been to find a middle ground that avoids the
extremes of over-and under-enforcement.
56
In contrast, European antitrust enforcers perceive competition
process as vulnerable and are more eager to address perceived distortions.
The ECJ defines an abuse of a dominant position as "an objective concept
relating to the behavior of an undertaking in a dominant position which is
such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very
presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is
weakened and which, through recourse to methods different from those
which condition normal competition in products or services on the basis of
the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the
maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the
growth of that competition. "57 A dominant company can do business as
long as its conduct fits within the concept of "normal competition,"' 58 but it
"has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine
undistorted competition on the Common Market." 59  The concept of
"special responsibility" 60 has been traced to Ordo-liberal school of thought
and interpreted to mean that a dominant company cannot use its market
power to exclude its rivals unfairly. 61 Yet, it is not clear what the "special
responsibility" exactly involves, other than conveying the message that
conduct of dominant companies may violate antitrust law, even if the same
conduct performed by a non-dominant company would not give rise to
antitrust liability. 62  The proposition that monopolists and firms in the
56 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique 2001,
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 257 (2001); Robert Pitofsky, Past, Present, and Future of Antitrust
Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission", 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 209 (2005).
57 Hoffmann La-Roche, 1978 E.C.R. 461, at 91.
58 See, e.g., Case T-65/98' Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 11-4653, 157;
Case T-65/89, BPB Industries PLC & British Gypsum Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1993 E.C.R. II-
389, 94.
59 Michelin 1, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, at 57; see also Joined Cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-
214/98, Atlantic Container Line AB et al. v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 11-3275, 1460
[hereinafter TACA].
60 What has become known as the Freiburg School or the Ordo-liberal School was founded
in the 1930s at the University of Freiburg in Germany by economist Walter Eucken and
two jurists, Franz B6hn and Hans Grof3mann-Doerth. Ordo-liberalism, an important trend
in political economic theory and the theory behind the German social market economy, is
based on the assumption that economic system cannot emerge.
61See Viktor V. Vanberg, The Freiburg School: Walter Eucken and Ordoliberalism, in
FREIBURGER DISKUSSIONSPAPIERE ZUR ORDNUNGSOKONOMIK (2004). See generally DAVID
J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE. PROTECTING
PROMETHEUS ch. VII (1998).
62 See Lang & O'Donoghue, supra note 9, at 42.
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process of acquiring market power are subject to greater scrutiny of their
behavior than other firms is rather uncontroversial.63 Indeed, similar
formulae may be found in the U.S. case law and legal literature, where it
was said that "behavior that otherwise may comply with antitrust law may
be impermissibly exclusionary when practices by a monopolist"64 and that
"a monopolist is not free to take certain actions that a company in a
competitive (or even oligopolistic) market may take, because there is no
market constraint on a monopolist's behavior.' 65 The notion of "special
responsibility" could potentially be understood as a means of shifting the
burden of proof on dominant companies. However, unlike Article 81,
which prohibits anticompetitive agreements, Article 82 does not provide for
an exemption from the general prohibition of exclusionary conduct.
The approach to efficiencies resulting from exclusionary conduct of
a dominant company is another major difference between the two
jurisdictions. Though efficiency considerations play a role under Article
82, they are not an absolute defense to an exclusionary conduct. In
principle, abusive practices are prohibited regardless of the advantages
which may accrue to the perpetrators of such practices or third parties.
66
Economic efficiency, however, plays a role in assessing specific practices.
For example, refusals to deal may be abusive only if the requested product
or service is indispensable, which involves proving that an equally efficient
competitor, operating on a comparable scale could not duplicate the input.
67
Predatory pricing is assessed in relation to the dominant company's costs.
68
EU Courts have also acknowledged that a dominant company may engage
in exclusionary practices if it offers an objective justification for its
conduct.
69
Article 82 Paper is an important step toward the recognition of
efficiency justifications in EU competition law. The Commission
acknowledges that the purpose of Article 82 is "not to protect competitors
63 See Kodak Co. v. image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 488 (1992), where Justice Scalia,
who represents the conservative camp in antitrust analysis, conceeds that "[w]here a
defendant maintains substantial market power, his activities are examined through a special
lens: Behavior that might otherwise not be of concern to the antitrust laws -- or that might
even be viewed as procompetitive -- can take on exclusionary connotations when practiced
by a monopolist."
64 United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005).
65 LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 151-152 (3d Cir. 2003); see also 3 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, 813, 300-02.
66 TA CA, 2003 E.C.R. 11-3275, T 1112.
67 Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791, 7 42-44.
68 See, e.g., Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 1-3359, 77 71-72;
Case C-333/94P, Tetra Pak Int'l SA v. Comm'n, 1996 E.C.R. 1-5951, 77 39-44. The issue
of assessment of predatory pricing remains controversial under EU competition law.
69 See, e.g., United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 7 182-184; Case 311/84, Centre belge
d'dtudes de march6 - T616marketing (CBEM) v. SA Compagnie luxembourgeoise de
t~lkdiffusion (CLT) and Information publicit6 Benelux (IPB), 1986 E.C.R. 3261, 27;
Case C-163/99, Portugal v. Comm'n, 2001 E.C.R. 2613, T 53.
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from dominant firms' genuine competition based on factors such as higher
quality, novel products, opportune innovation or otherwise better
performance, but to ensure that these competitors are also able to expand in
or enter the market and compete therein on the merits, without facing
competition conditions which are distorted or impaired by the dominant
firm." 70 Thus, it takes the view that "in general only conduct which would
exclude a hypothetical 'as efficient' competitor is abusive."71 Exclusionary
conduct will not be condemned under Article 82 if a dominant company
"can demonstrate that its conduct produces efficiencies which outweigh the
negative effect on competition." 72 To benefit from the efficiency defense, a
dominant company must demonstrate that the challenged conduct 1) gives
rise or is likely to give rise to efficiencies; 2) is indispensable to achieve the
efficiencies; 3) consumers benefit from the efficiencies; and 4) competition
in respect of a substantial part of the products concerned must not be
eliminated.73  These conditions are cumulative. Yet, even substantial
efficiency gains cannot justify exclusive conduct if it results in elimination
of all competitors. The Commission stresses that the ultimate aim of
competition law is "the protection of rivalry and the competitive process"
and that possible pro-competitive efficiency gains must give way to this
goal.74 The Commission takes the view that a super-dominant company
engaging in an exclusionary conduct is unlikely to be able to rely on
efficiency gains to justify its conduct. 75
Article 82 Paper brings the European position closer to the
American views on exclusionary conduct, albeit with the important
reservation about the protection of competitive process. This development
should be welcomed, as it gives room for a more economically sound
assessment of exclusive conduct under EC competition law. It seems,
however, that these general rules have limited influence on the
Commission's stance on particular examples of exclusionary practices
discussed in the Article 82 Paper. The treatment of refusals to deal, both in
the Commission's practice and the Article 82 Paper is a good example of
this phenomenon.
II. ESSENTIAL FACILITIES
The instances where Article 82 or § 2 of the Sherman Act were
applied to condemn unilateral refusals to deal are among the most
controversial antirust cases. They are provide an excellent example of how
70 See Article 82 Paper, supra note 10, at 54.
71 The "as efficient" competitor is defined as "a hypothetical competitor having the same
costs as the dominant company." Id. at 63-64.
72 [d. at 77.
73 Id. at 84.
74 Id. at 91.
75 id.
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the differences in the general concepts applicable to unilateral conduct play
out in individual cases. The rules applicable to unilateral refusals to deal
are the framework under which unilateral refusals to license are assessed in
the two jurisdictions. This section is meant to comment on the status of the
essential facilities in the two jurisdictions, as a background to understand
the differences in the application of antitrust law to unilateral refusals to
license.
Both in Europe and in the United States, the basic premise is that a
monopolist does not have an obligation to deal or to assist its competitors.
76
Yet, in a number of cases refusals to deal were condemned as
anticompetitive in the two jurisdictions. This has been particularly the case
where a refusal to supply concerned an "essential" or "bottleneck" facility:
a product that is so superior that it is essential for the rivals to compete and
cannot practically be duplicated.77 The essential facilities doctrine has been
traced back to the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Terminal
Railroads Association.78  The Terminal Road Association acquired all
railroad facilities necessary to load or unload freight traffic or passengers
anywhere within the area of St. Louis. The government brought an antitrust
suit seeking to dissolve the Association. The Court found that consolidation
of terminal facilities created important benefits, so instead of splitting the
Association, it requested that competing railroad lines are given access to
the facilities under fair and impartial terms. Another case often discussed in
the context of essential facilities theory is Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States.79  The case concerned an antitrust charge against Otter Tail, an
electric power company, concerning the maintenance of its monopolistic
position by preventing the towns it served from establishing their own
municipal systems when its retail franchises expired. Otter Tail refused to
sell energy at wholesale and refused to agree to wheel power from other
76 Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
408 (2004). The ECJ held that refusals to deal give rise to liability under Article 82 of the
EC Treaty only in limited circumstances. See Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791, 38-47.
Advocate General Jacobs in his Opinion in this case said that "the right to choose one's
trading partners and freely dispose of one's property are generally recognized principles in
the laws of the Member States, in some cases with constitutional status." Id. 56; see also
Case C-418/01, IMS Heath GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG (IMS),
2004 E.C.R. 1-5039, 34 (holding that refusal to license cannot in itself constituted an
abuse of a dominant position) and the Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-53103,
Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akamanias (Syfait) and Others v.
GlaxoSmithKline AEVE, 2005 E.C.R. 1-4609, 53. The Commission in the Article 82
Paper confirms that dominant companies are "generally entitled to determine whom to
supply and to decide not to continue to supply certain trading partners." Article 82 Paper,
supra note 10, 207.
" See, e.g., Philip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles,
58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1989); Elhauge, supra note 11, at 261-62; Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. &
J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1187 (1999).
78 236 U.S. 194 (1915).
'9 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
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suppliers of wholesale energy to these municipalities. The Supreme Court
held that Otter Tail's policy violated § 2 of the Sherman Act. Otter Tail
was not insulated from antitrust scrutiny for refusing to wholesale or wheel
power to municipal distribution systems, even though a regulatory agency
had the authority to compel involuntary interconnections of power. In
Aspen,80 the Supreme Court ruled that Aspen Skiing Company, owner of the
three flagship ski mountains in Aspen, violated § 2 of the Sherman Act by
refusing to cooperate with its smaller rival in providing a four-mountain
ticket. Under Aspen, a monopolist's refusal is illegal when it significantly
excludes rivals, unless defendant proves an efficiency justification. 81 In
MCI v. AT&T,82 the Seventh Circuit expressly relied on the essential
facilities doctrine and identified four elements necessary to establish
antitrust liability under the doctrine as follows: (1) control of the essential
facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically or
reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the
facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility.83 In
such circumstances, access to the facility may be ordered on reasonable and
non-discriminatory terms.
The essential facilities doctrine has been the subject of severe
criticism in the United States. 84 The Supreme Court joined this criticism in
Trinko. The case challenged anticompetitive practices of Verizon, an
incumbent local telephone service exchange carrier for New York. Verizon
controls a local loop, access to which is necessary to provide local
telephone service. Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, incumbent
local exchange carriers are obliged to share their networks with competitors
and to give them access to individual network elements to the same extent
and quality as they make it available to themselves. 85 In particular, Verizon
was obliged to provide access to operations support systems (OSS) used to
provide services to customers and ensure quality. The rivals complained to
telecom regulators that many of their orders were going unfulfilled, in
violation of Verizon's obligation to provide access to OSS functions. This
impeded the rivals' ability to compete in the market for local telephone
service. The investigation that ensued resulted in a consent decree
80 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
81 Id. at 605, 608. See also Eleanor M. Fox, The European Union: Dedicated to the
Professor Valentine Korah: Article: A Tale of Two Jurisdictions and an Orphan Case:
Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and Refusals to Deal, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 952, 957-58
(2005).
82 MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.
1983); see also Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1990).
13 [d. at 1132-1133.
84 See, e.g., 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, 770E, 77 lb-c, 773a; Areeda, supra
note 77; Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 77.
85 The GATS Telecommunication Services Reference Paper (1996),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/serv e/telecom e/te123 e.htm, specifies that access to
network must be given on reasonable, transparent and non-discriminatory terms.
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subjecting Verizon to remediation measures and additional reporting
requirements. Following the publication of the consent decree, Trinko, a
customer of one of Verizon's rivals, filed a class action alleging, inter alia,
that Verizon's behavior with respect to providing access to its network was
a § 2 violation. The question before the Supreme Court was whether
monopolists controlling a necessary input were obliged under the Sherman
Act to provide its rivals with access to that input. The Court begun its
reasoning by stressing that firms which "acquire monopoly power by
establishing an infrastructure that renders them uniquely suited to serve
their customers" should not be compelled "to share the source of their
advantage" with their competitors.8 6  It warned of the cost of false
condemnations and difficulties in administering remedies in refusal to deal
cases.87 The Court recognized, however, that there are two exceptions from
the freedom to deal principle: the Aspen exception and, possibly, the
essential facilities exception. The Court stressed that it has never
recognized the essential facilities doctrine.8 8 Without acknowledging that
the doctrine is valid, the Court gave it a narrow reading. It held that it could
not be applied in a situation like the one before it, where an inferior access
to the facility is given, or if compelled sharing can be ordered under state or
federal laws.89 Neither Aspen exception was available, as it could only be
applied to a unilateral termination of a voluntary and profitable course of
dealings suggesting that the defendant was willing to "forsake short-term
profits to achieve an anticompetitive end."90  By contrast, Verizon had
never voluntarily shared its infrastructure with rivals, and probably would
not have done so absent statutory compulsion. In seems that the Trinko
Court narrowed Aspen exception to the situation where a monopolist 1)
terminates a voluntary and presumptively profitable agreement with a
competitor and 2) sacrifices its short-term profits to create or strengthen its
monopoly and reap greater profits in the long run. Trinko suggests that
there are two narrowly tailored exceptions to a general principle that a
refusal to deal does not violate antitrust law: 1) essential facility theory
(assuming that it is valid) and 2) in case of termination, a modified version
of the short-term profit sacrifice test.91 The Trinko decision is controversial
86 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
408 (2004).
87 Id. The Court said that the doctrine "requires antitrust courts to act as central planners,
identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing" and that it may chill the
incentives to invest in infrastructure development, or even facilitate collusion.
8 Id. at 411.
89 Id. at 410-11. The Court ruled that Verizon's insufficient assistance in the provision of
service to its competitors did not give rise to antitrust liability under the Court's refusal-to-
deal precedents.
90 Id. at 408-09.
91 See Eleanor M. Fox, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions and an Orphan Case: Antitrust, IP, and
Refusals to Deal 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 952, 958-59 (2005); see also John Thorne, A
Categorical Rule Limiting Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Verizon v. Trinko, 72 U. CHI. L.
2006-2007
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and it remains to be seen how it will be interpreted by lower courts, but it
may significantly limit the scope for antitrust condemnation of unilateral
refusals to deal.
Whereas the essential facilities doctrine has been questioned in the
U.S., it has been steadily growing in significance in Europe. The Article 82
Paper stands for a relatively wide scope for antitrust intervention in cases
involving unilateral refusals to deal. The Commission concedes that forced
sharing may have adverse effects on investment incentives, but notes its
beneficial influence on competition in the secondary market and investment
in follow-on R&D. 92 It identifies four situations in which refusal to deal
violates EU competition law: 1) terminating an existing supply relationship;
2) refusing to supply an essential input; 3) refusing to supply information
protected by IPRs; and 4) refusing to supply information necessary for
interoperability. 93 The Commission notes that the requested input is usually
necessary to compete in the downstream market and a refusal to provide it
leads to a vertical foreclosure. 94 Refusals to deal are abusive only when
they have "a likely anticompetitive effect on the market which is
detrimental to consumer welfare." 95  An obligation to deal pursuant to
Article 82 may be established after a close scrutiny of the factual,
regulatory, and economic context in which the case arises.
96
The Article 82 Paper gives a broad reading to the essential facilities
doctrine. A dominant company may be subjected to a duty-to-deal when it
controls an essential input and the refusal to supply it is "likely to have a
negative effect on competition" and if it is not "objectively justified. ' ,97 The
requested input must be indispensable, which implies that there must be no
real or potential substitutes available on the market and that it is impossible
to duplicate the input.98 As it has been discussed above, the Commission
takes the view that apart from an outright refusal to supply other practices
such as "delaying tactics in supplying, imposing unfair trading conditions,
or charging excessive prices for the input" may be caught.99 Termination of
an existing customer attracts even greater degree of antitrust scrutiny, as in
REV. 289, 298-99 (arguing that refusals to deal may violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
only when there is an element of discrimination and a history of previous dealings. In such
cases, it is easier for courts to define the terms of granting access).
92 See Article 82 Paper, supra note 10, at 213.
93 Id. at 209, 215.
94 Id. at 209, 212-13. The Commission notes that other types of refusal to deal, i.e. those
that are ancillary to other types of anticompetitive conduct such as tying or exclusive
dealing, may lead to a horizontal foreclosure. The Commission also notes that elimination
of competition in the downstream market may make it less attractive for potential rivals to
challenge the position of the dominant company in the upstream market.95 [d. at 210.
96 [d. at 214.
97 Id. at 224.
98 Id. at 228-29.
99 Id. at 225.
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such case a dominant company must be able to prove that the termination
was objectively justified. 100 The Commission seems to take the view that
the history of previous dealings obviates the need of showing
indispensability. 0 1 Termination of an existing customer or a refusal to start
supplying an input may violate Article 82 if they have "market distorting
foreclosure effect." This is not understood to mean the complete
elimination of all competition; in some cases an exclusion of one competitor
may be sufficient to establish "market distorting foreclosure effect." The
Commission seems to infer that a refusal to deal is anticompetitive if the
owner of the input is itself active in the downstream market. 102 Notably, the
Commission does not adopt a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for
imposing a duty-to-deal; the conditions listed in the Paper are merely
guidelines under which refusals to deal will be assessed. 1
03
The Clearstream Decision 104 is a good illustration of how the
Commission approaches cases involving unilateral refusals to deal in
practice, since it is recent and based on the Commission's past experience.
Clearstream is the sole provider of primary clearing and settlement services
for securities issued under German law and is the only German Central
Securities Depository. Euroclear Bank asked Clearstream to provide it with
direct access to primary clearing and settlement services for German
securities. Though Clearstream was slow to respond to Euroclear Bank's
request, it eventually agreed to provide the service. The Commission found
that Clearstream had a dominant position in a narrowly defined market for
the "provision by the issuer [Central Security Depository] to intermediaries
like [Central Securities Depositories] and [International Central Securities
Depositories] of primary clearing and settlement services for securities
100 Id. at 222, 224; see also BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 32, at 941-45; JONES & SUFRIN,
supra note 32, 376-77.
101 See Article 82 Paper, supra note 10, at 218. However, it would be difficult to fulfill the
condition that a refusal to deal is likely to have a negative effect on competition, if other
sources of supply are actually or potentially available. As it will be explained below, this
position seems to be at odds with the ECJ's ruling in Bronner.
102 Id. at 222-24, 231-33. The Commission takes the view that termination of an existing
customer, if the input owner is itself active in the downstream market, creates a
presumption of a negative effect on competition in the downstream market. If a dominant
company wishes to integrate downstream and itself perform the downstream activities, it
has to show that "consumers are better off with the supply relationship terminated."
103 See, e.g., id. at 218 (referring to conditions that "normally have to be fulfilled" to find
the termination of a supply relationship abusive); id. at 224 (referring to conditions that
"normally have to be fulfilled" to find a refusal to supply an essential facility abusive); id.
at 237 (referring to additional condition that "may have to be met" to fird a refusal to
license abusive).
104 Commission Decision in case COMP/38.096 (June 2, 2004), at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/38096/en.pdf. Under
appeal case T- 301/04.
2006-2007
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issued under German law. ,105 It decided that the delay in providing the
service constituted a refusal to deal in violation of Article 82 of the EC
Treaty because: 1) Clearstream was an "unavoidable trading partner": there
was no alternative to its services; 2) Euroclear Bank could not duplicate the
service offered by Clearstream; and 3) Clearstream's refusal to supply
impaired Euroclear's ability to offer its services in the downstream market
for cross-border clearing and settlement of EU securities. In addition, the
Commission took into account the fact there was a reduction in the services
that Clearstream provided to Euroclear Bank and Clearstream's
discriminatory behavior. The companies concerned had a history of
previous dealings. The reduction in the services provided to Euroclear
Bank allegedly resulted from the growing importance of registered shares in
Germany, for which the requested service was crucial. Clearstream's
behavior amounted to a breach of Euroclear's "legitimate expectations" that
it would be supplied by Clearstream with primary clearing and settlement
services within a reasonable time. 106 The Commission alleged that
Clearstream provided other companies with access to its services within a
shorter period of time following their request. Clearstream also charged
Euroclear Bank higher prices for its services. The Commission did not
allege that competition in the downstream market would be eliminated or
that rival's existence depended on giving access to the requested service.
10 7
Indeed, it can hardly be said that the delay in providing services led to the
elimination of all competition in this case, though it might have imposed a
number of disadvantages on Euroclear Bank.
Early ECJ case law also points to the conclusion that there are
numerous circumstances when the duty to deal may be imposed under EU
competition law. In Commercial Solvents, the Court ruled that a refusal to
supply raw materials by a company "which has a dominant position in the
market in raw materials and which, with the object of reserving such raw
material for manufacturing its own derivatives, refuses to supply a
customer, which is itself a manufacturer of these derivatives, and therefore
risks eliminating all competition on the part of this customer, is abusing its
dominant position within the meaning of Article [82]."' 1 8 No inquiry was
made in the actual effects of the termination in the downstream market.
Whereas, in Commercial Solvents, the Court challenged vertical integration,
105 Id. at 199-201. The Commission at great length explains why, for certain customers,
indirect access to the issuer Central Securities Depository or the provision by the issuer of
primary settlement and clearing services to other clients (banks) are separate markets to the
provision of primary clearing and settlement services to Central Securities Depositories and
International Central Securities Depository. Id. at 135-95.
106 Id. at 224, 227-43.
107 In the same vein, the Article 82 Paper provides that although a refusal to deal can only
be abusive when it has a negative effect on competition, it does not mean that the refusal
can only be found abusive if it leads to elimination that all competition from the
downstream market. See Article 82 Paper, supra note 10, at 222, 231.
108 Case 6 and 7/73, Commercial Solvents v. Comm'n, 1974 E.C.R. 223, 25.
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in United Brands,10 9 exclusive dealing was targeted. In United Brands, the
Court ruled that United Brand's termination of a customer, after the latter
had participated in an advertising campaign of one of United Brand's
competitors, was an abuse of a dominant position. The Court reasoned that
a dominant company "for the purpose of marketing a product which cashes
on the reputation of a brand name known to and valued by consumers
cannot stop supplying a long standing customer who abides by regular
commercial practice, if the orders placed by that customer are in no way out
of the ordinary.""10  Unlike in Commercial Solvents, the terminated
distributor retained other sources of supply and there was no danger that
competition from the downstream market would be eliminated. Again,
there was no evidence that a refusal to supply will lead to higher prices in
the downstream market. In Til~marketing, the Court held that a company
that was granted exclusivity in a particular market may commit an abuse of
a dominant position if it "reserves to itself an ancillary activity which might
be carried out by another undertaking as a part of its activities on a
neighboring but separate market, with the possibility of eliminating all
competition from such undertaking."11' Thus, a state-owned company
109 1978 E.C.R. 207.
"°Id. at 182.
. See Case 311/84, Centre belge d'6tudes de march6 - T6lmarketing (CBEM) v. SA
Compagnie luxembourgeoise de t~l~diffusion (CLT) and Information publicit6 Benelux
(IPB), 1985 E.C.R. 3261, 25-27. CLT run the RTL TV station and IPB was the exclusive
agent who sold television advertising aimed at the Benelux countries. CBEM organized
telemarketing services on the RTL station. It concluded an agreement with IPB, whereby
CLT had a legal monopoly in the market for television advertising aimed at viewers in
French-speaking Belgium. By contrast, competition was possible in the market for
telemarketing services. The case concerned a refusal by the CLT and IPB to sell CBEM
television time on the RTL TV station for telephone marketing operations using a
telephone number other than that of IPB. The court held that Article 82 applied to a
company holding a dominant position on a particular market where that position is due not
to the activities of the company itself, but to the fact that by reason of provisions laid down
by law there can be no competition or only very limited competition on the market. Id.
18. Such company abuses its dominant position if it reserves to itself an ancillary activity
in a neighboring market thereby excluding any other company from that market. The
Court applied this principle in a different set of circumstances in Case C-18/88, R~gie des
t~lkgraphes et des t~lkphones (RTT) v. GB-Inno-BM SA, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5973. RTT held a
monopoly over the establishment and operation of the public telephone system in Belgium,
it also supplied telecommunication equipment for use by its customers. The law also gave
it the exclusive competence to approve the equipment that could be connected to its
network. GB-INNO sold in its shops equipment that was not approved by RTT. RTT sued
GB-INNO to enjoin it from selling telephones without informing the purchasers that they
were not approved by RTT. Relying on its decision in CBEM, the Court held that the
extension of the dominant position of a company to which the State has granted special or
exclusive rights results from a State measure, such measure constitutes an infringement of
Article 82 of the EC Treaty, §§ 18-21. In this case, the exclusion or restriction of
competition in the neighboring market could not be justified by a task of public service: the
quality of the equipment could have been secured by means of laying down specifications
for the said equipment and by establishing a procedure for type-approval to check whether
23
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could not refuse to supply its competitor in a downstream market with an
input over which it held monopoly. The Court applied similar reasoning in
the cases concerning refusals to license IPRs. As it will be explained in
more detail below, these cases stand for the proposition that although a
simple refusal to license does not violate antitrust law, a holder of IP cannot
extend her monopoly to a separate, neighboring market. Unilateral refusals
to deal were targeted under Article 82 in different circumstances and few, if
any, limiting principles could be inferred from the older ECJ's case law.
112
The more recent pronouncements on refusals to deal from the ECJ
indicate that the Court limited the circumstances in which a refusal to deal
may be deemed abusive. In particular, the Bronner decision 113 sets new,
higher standard under which a duty to deal may be imposed. 14  The case
concerned a refusal to include a newspaper in a home-delivery scheme of
Mediaprint, a large Austrian newspaper group. Advocate General Jacobs
advised the Court to limit the scope of refusals to deal doctrine. He noted
that forced sharing reduces the incentives to make the original investment in
the development of a facility, reduces the incentives of competitors to
develop better products, 115 and forces courts to act as regulators in setting
of the terms under which access should be granted." 6 He concluded that a
duty to deal should be imposed only when an essential facility is involved
and the refusal leads to elimination of all competition on the part of the
company requesting the service. 117 The ECJ followed suit. It first invited
the Austrian court to consider whether a home-delivery scheme could be
considered a separate market, or whether other methods of distributing
newspapers (sale in shops and kiosks, delivery by post) should be included
in the relevant market. Assuming that Mediaprint was dominant in the
marker for home-delivery scheme, the Bronner Court held that a duty to
deal may be imposed only if 1) the refusal is likely to eliminate all
competition in the downstream market on the part of the person requesting
those specifications are met. It must be stressed that there was no allegation that RTT
behaved improperly in its authorization of telephones. The Court did not question the
behavior of the dominant company, but rather, it was the state measures which effectively
extended the monopoly position from one market to another.
112 See Sebastien J. Evrard, Essential Facilities in the European Union: Bronner and
Beyond, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 491, 505 (2004); Lang, supra note 9.
113 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH &
Co. KG and Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co. KG (Bronner), 1998 ECR I-
7791.
114 See Eilmansberger, supra note 9, at 156-57; Evrard, supra note 112, at 494-95; Geradin,
supra note 9, at 1526; Petros Mavroidis, Damien Neven & Bronner Kebab, Beyond Refusal
To Deal And Duty To Cooperate, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL (Claus D.
Ehlermann & Isabella Atanasiu eds., 2003); James S. Venit, Article 82: The Last Frontier -
Fighting Fire with Fire, 28 FORDHAm INT'L L.J. 1157, 1173-74 (2005).
115 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Bronner, 1998 ECR 1-7791, 57.
116 Id. at 69.
117 Id. at 58.
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the service; 2) the refusal is not objectively justified, and 3) the requested
service is indispensable for the person requesting it to carry on that person's
business, inasmuch as there are no actual or potential substitute for the
requested facility. 118 The requirement of indispensability is not fulfilled if
there are other means to obtain the input, even if such means are less
advantageous. In assessing the ability to obtain actual or potential
substitutes, courts should not consider the situation of the company
requesting the input, but rather, a company of a comparable size and
efficiency to the dominant firm. Absent from the earlier case law, the
requirement of indispensability limits application of Article 82 to cases
involving essential inputs. Under Bronner a duty to deal may be imposed
only with respect to an input that can be validly characterized as an essential
facility, even if there was a history of previous dealings. 119 The key issue is
Bronner's relation to the Commercial Solvents line of case law. I agree
with those commentators who see Bronner as a case that builds on the older
cases by adding economic rigor to the analysis. 120 Bronner's limiting
principles are equally applicable to termination cases. After all, the main
competitive concern in refusal to deal cases is the access to a captive input
regardless whether it has been granted before or not. 121  Yet, the
Commission's interpretation seems to be that a history of previous dealings
obviates the need to show indispensability. 1
22
To my mind, the open-ended approach advocated by the
Commission and its broad reading of the conditions of indispensability and
market foreclosure goes against the Bronner Court's intentions. The
standards proposed by the Commission to assess refusals to deal create the
risk of over-enforcement and may encourage rivals to engage in antitrust
118 Id. at41.
119 See BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 32, at 946-47.
120 This conclusion is supported by the ECJ's interpretation of its earlier case law. The
Court held that "[a]lthough in Commercial Solvents v Commission and CBEM, cited
above, the Court of Justice held the refusal by an undertaking holding a dominant position
in a given market to supply an undertaking with which it was in competition in a
neighbouring market with raw materials (Commercial Solvents v Commission, paragraph
25) and services (CBEM, paragraph 26) respectively, which were indispensable to carrying
on the rival's business, to constitute an abuse, it should be noted, first, that the Court did so
to the extent that the conduct in question was likely to eliminate all competition on the part
of that undertaking." Bronner, 1998 ECR 1-7791, 38; see also Opinion of AG Maduro in
Case C-109/03, KPN Telecom v. OPTA, 32; Geradin, supra note 9, at 1526; Cyril Ritter,
Refusal to Deal and Essential Facilities: Does Intellectual Property Require Special
Deference Compared to Tangible Property?, 28 WORLD COMPETITION 281, 282-84. But see
Hatzopoulos, Case Note, IMS, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1613 (2004) (arguing that IMS
confirms that "essential facilities" case law is different from Commercial Solvents line of
case law).
121 See, e.g., Christophe Humpe & Cyril Ritter, Refusal to Deal, GCLC RESEARCH PAPER
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litigation instead of investing in the development of better products. 2 3
Clear standards are particularly important now that national competition
authorities of Member States are obliged to apply Article 82. 12 Recent
decisions suggest that national competition authorities are inclined to follow
the Commission's approach to refusals to deal, or even go further than that,
making over-enforcement a real threat. 125 I submit that the test adopted by
the ECJ in Bronner provides a better guidance than the Commission's
approach to refusals to deal expressed in the Article 82 Paper and in its
recent decisions. The Bronner test is also more akin to the restraint
exercised by the Supreme Court in Trinko. Yet, even Bronner, the case
when the ECJ adopted the narrowest reading of essential facilities doctrine,
goes further than the U.S. Supreme Court in Trinko. This, as it will be
shown in Section 4 below, has a decisive effect on the assessment of
unilateral refusals to license.
III. LIMITS OF ANTITRUST: MONOPOLIES CREATED BY STATE
The use of essential facilities doctrine to remedy negative effects
that state-created monopolies have on markets is an example how antitrust
rules may impinge on industrial regulation. The relation between sectoral
regulation and antirust rules is also relevant for the application of antitrust
rules to mitigate the consequences of imperfections in IP regime. The ECJ
willingness to scrutinize Member States' national laws for their compliance
with EU competition policy is relevant in the context of IP legislation. A
number of commentators interpreted the ECJ decisions in cases involving
123 See Ridyard, supra note 9, at 670; Ian S. Forrester, Article 82- Remedies in Search of
Theories, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 919, 921-22 (2005).
124 As of May 1, 2004, in accordance with Council Regulation No 1/2003 on the
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty,
2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, all EU Member States' antitrust authorities are obliged to apply EU
competition law in parallel to their domestic provisions, if the challenged conduct may
affect trade between Member States.
125 For example, the Greek Competition Commission by Decision No 193/111 of 3 August
2001 ordering interim measures found that GSK violated Article 82 and Greek competition
law by limiting the supply of certain pharmaceutical products in order to limit parallel
imports to other EU Member States. The case was referred to the ECJ (C-53103
Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akamanias (Syfait) and Others v.
Glaxosmithkline AEVE, 2005 E.C.R. 1-4609), which refused to rule on the merits. The
Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection found that Kompania Weglowa, a
grouping of several Polish coal mines, violated Polish competition law by refusing to
supply coal to a small distributor. The Office found the refusal abusive as a smaller part of
a vertical integration strategy, leading to the elimination of small distributors from the coal
distribution market. It does not seem very likely that coal can be characterized as an
essential input and the decision did not address the question whether vertical integration
could have been justified by efficiency considerations (Decision of 12 December 2005, No.
RKT-64/2005).
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compulsory licensing as a restraint that EU competition law imposes on
what was considered an "aberrant" national IP right. 1
26
European integration brought about an opening of national markets
and it has been accompanied by a process of economic liberalization. After
the removal of customs duties and quantitative barriers to trade, the next
hurdle was national monopolies, often associated with distortion of trade
within the EU. 127  State-owned monopolies and monopolies created by
companies which were awarded an exclusive or protected position hinder
competition. EU competition law was used to curb anticompetitive policies
at the national level and to erode the position of national monopolies. 128 In
Hifner, the Court ruled that under certain conditions, the very existence of a
state monopoly right may violate EU competition law. 129 A way in which
state monopoly is organized can also violate the EC Treaty. 130  In
Fiammiferi,' the ECJ concluded that the EC Treaty obliges Member
States to refrain from introducing measures which may deprive competition
rules of their useful effect by requiring or encouraging anti-competitive
conduct, reinforcing the effects of such conduct, or delegating to private
126 See, e.g., Valentine Korah, Patents and Antitrust, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 395, 402-07
(1997); Ian S. Forrester, Compulsory Licensing in Europe: A Rare Cure to Aberrant
National Intellectual Property Rights?, Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission
Hearings, Washington (May 22, 2002),
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020522forrester.pdf.
127 See Wolfgang Streeck, The Internationalization of Industrial Relations in Europe:
Prospects and Problems, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, 1 WORKING
PAPER SERIES IN EUROPEAN STUDIES, No. 1, 3-4, http://uw-madison-
ces.org/papers/streeck.pdf.
128See Article 86 of the EC Treaty which concerns application of EU competition law to
State-owned companies and those granted special or exclusive rights. In Case 13/77 SA
G.B.-INNO-B.M. v Association des d~taillants en tabac (ATAB), 1977 E.C.R. 2115, 31,
the ECJ held that the Treaty imposes a duty on Member States not to adopt or maintain in
force measures which could deprive the competition provisions of their effectiveness.
129Case C-41/90 Klaus Hofner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1979, 28-
31; see also Case C-323/93 Socidt6 Civile Agricole du Centre d'Insdmination de la
Crespelle v Coopdrative d'Elevage et d'Insdmination Artificielle du Ddpartement de la
Mayenne, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5077, 18.
13Case 260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE (ERT) v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis,
1991 E.C.R. 1-2925, 11. The Court held that EC Treaty prevented the granting of an
exclusive right to transmit and an exclusive right to retransmit television broadcasts to a
single company, where those rights were liable to create a situation in which that company
is led to infringe Article 82 by virtue of discriminatory broadcasting policy which favors its
own programs. Id. at 37-38. The test employed in this case is less strict than that adopted
in Hfner, where the infringement by the monopolist was unavoidable. In this case,
cumulating of rights in the hands of the monopolist created a situation when a monopolist
was led to infringe Article 82, as it would inevitably discriminate in favor of retransmitting
its own programs. See JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 32, at 442; see also Case C-179/90
Merci convenzionali porto di Genova SpA v Siderurgica Gabrielli SpA, 1991 E.C.R. I-
5889, 17, 19.
"' Case C-198/01 CIF Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi v. Autorit Garante della
Concorrenza e del Mercato, 2003 E.C.R. 1-8055.
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traders responsibility for taking key decisions affecting the economic
sphere. 132 The Court referred to Articles 4(1) and 98 of the EC Treaty,
which provide that Member States must observe the principle of an open
market economy and free competition in the context of their national
economic policies. 33  Invoking the principles of supremacy and
effectiveness of EU law, the ECJ concluded that a national competition
authority must ensure that the EC Treaty rules on competition are observed
and disregard any conflicting national legislation. 
134
By comparison, the scope for antitrust intervention in the case of
state-created distortions to competition is limited in America. According to
the state action doctrine, the Sherman Act is generally inapplicable to action
by a state operating in its sovereign capacity, or to private conduct approved
and supervised by a state as a matter of state policy.135  The doctrine was
established by the Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown, 136 a case concerning
the Californian Agricultural Prorate Act. The Act provided that private
producers could be ordered to hold raisins off the market in order to raise
prices and thereby prevent "economic waste" and giving the authority to
make such decisions to a self-interested body. 137 The Court found that such
arrangements were not preempted by the Sherman Act. The Court's
holding rested both on statutory history and language, and on considerations
of federalism: "[i]n a dual system of government in which, under the
Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may
constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to
nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be
attributed to Congress."' 138 The Court reasoned that Congress did not intend
for federal antitrust laws to be a mechanism for challenging state policies.
132 Id. at 46, 50.
133 Id. at 47.
134 Id. at 47-48. The Court clarified that in such situation companies involved in the
anticompetitive conduct were shielded from penalties and private litigation until the public
authority does not question the legislation as anticompetitive.
135 The scope of the exception depends on the nature of the defendant and the type of
challenged action. Actions taken by government bodies are virtually always exempt. More
stringent standards apply to actions taken by private parties, who must demonstrate that the
conduct challenged as anticompetitive was both clearly authorized by the state and was
subject to active state supervision. See generally I AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18,
at 221.
136 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
137 California Agricultural Prorate Act of June 5, 1933, Statutes of California 1933, ch. 754,
as amended by chs. 471 and 743, Statutes of 1935; ch. 6, Extra Session, 1938; chs. 363,
548 and 894, Statutes of 1939; and chs. 603, 1150 and 1186, Statutes of 1941. A program
of restrictions could be adopted by a state commission, on application by ten producers.
The program was to be administered by a committee including the representatives of the
producers. The committee could propose price-enhancing restrictions, which were subject
to the approval of the state commission. The restrictive program would go into effect upon
a favorable vote of the producers.
'
3 8See Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
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Under Parker, there is limited scope for application of federal antitrust laws
in a situation where the state attempts to authorize or compel
anticompetitive private behavior.
The federal preemption doctrine was used more successfully against
state laws that prevent pro-competitive behavior.139 In the context of IP, the
Supreme Court held that states were not permitted to use their common law
of unfair competition to prevent copying of unpatented and unpatentable
product, as it would interfere with federal patent and antitrust law. 140 The
Court has also held that federal law preempted state contract law that
prevented a licensee from challenging the validity of the licensed IP. 14 1 It
must be noted, however, that in both cases the state laws were struck chiefly
because they were inconsistent with federal patent laws, while antitrust laws
seemed to play a marginal role in the Court's reasoning.
The existence of state-created monopolies and the inefficiencies they
entail are a source of concern on both sides of the Atlantic. Europeans see
an important role for antitrust to address such distortions. In contrast,
Americans prefer to remedy such problems through sectoral regulation. As
it will be showed below, the same pattern can be identified in the way
antirust law is applied to IP in these two jurisdictions.
IV. STRIKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN ANTITRUST AND IP
The most frequently noted economic rationale for IP protection is
that it encourages private investment in R&D and spurs innovation. 142
Bringing new products onto the market is costly and without IP protection
competitors could appropriate the invention before its creator had the ability
to earn a profit from her investment. Assigning exclusive rights in the
outcomes of creative and intellectual efforts increases incentives to develop
139 See Areeda, supra note 18, at 217.
141 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
14'Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
142 See, e.g., Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Inventions, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS 619 (R. Nelson ed., 1962); WILLIAM NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND
WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969); 1
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 35, 1.1; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989); Richard A. Posner,
IP: The Law and Economics Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57 (2005). Other authors rely
on the Lockean labor-deserves argument: people are entitled to hold as property whatever
they produce by their own initiative, intelligence, and industry, for example, Justin Hughes,
The Philosophy of IP, 77 GEO. L. J. 287, 299-330 (1988), or the theories based on privacy
and sovereignty of individuals, for example, MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING
PROPERTY (1993); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988). For an
overview see for example, William Fisher, Theories of 1P, in STEPHEN R. MUNZER, NEW
ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY (2001); ROBERT L.
OSTERGARD DEVELOPMENT DILEMMA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IPRS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 11 (2002).
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new products. IPRs also play a role in the dissemination of innovation and
facilitate commercial development of ideas. 143 They may also contribute to
coordination of follow-on research. Yet, the IP system comes at a price.
Granting exclusive rights in IP denies society the benefit of using and
possessing something that all people could use and enjoy concurrently. It
interferes with diffusion of ideas, follow-on innovation and limits the
options for putting these ideas to work. It prevents competition in the
commercialization of artistic works and scientific inventions and usually
gives IP holders some power over prices. Though it may be necessary to
allow the latter to recover of R&D expenditure and to create incentives for
follow-on innovation, it also means higher prices for consumers in short144
run.
IP laws are designed to strike a balance between these divergent
interests by granting owners exclusive rights and protecting the interests of
users through a variety of exceptions and limitations. IPRs never give
unlimited protection against copying. Their duration is limited and they
protect only certain aspects of the work or invention. Copyright covers the
form alone, but not the ideas underlying the work. Trade secrets are
protected insofar as they are kept secret. A patent extends only to
commercial exploitation of the protected invention. The scope of a patent is
defined by patent claims and the claims may extend only to the elements
that are new and non-obvious. There are also numerous specific exceptions
embodied in IP laws. The exercise of patent rights is restricted by patent
misuse doctrine. "Fair use" of copyrighted works is allowed, so is
independent development of similar works. Copyright law contains a
number of compulsory licensing provisions applicable inter alia to cover
versions of musical compositions, 145 and retransmission of broadcast
stations by cable systems. 146  The same is true for new forms of IP
protection. For example, the EU Software Directive allows reproduction of
143 See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. &
EcoN. 265 (1977); James Anton & Dennis Yao, Expropriation and Inventions:
Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 190 (1994).
144 It also means monopoly loss, which the monopolist imposes on society by limiting his
output below the level which consumers would be willing to purchase at a competitive
price. In simple terms, fewer people will be able to buy the work than if it were sold at a
competitive price. For discussion of economics of IP see for example, WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF IP (2003); Stanley M.
Bessen & Leo J. Raskind, An introduction to the Law and Economics of IP, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 3 (1991), Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for IP, 71 U. Chi.
L. R. 129 (2004); Suzanne Scotchmer, The Political Economy of IP Treaties, 20 J. L.
EcoN. & ORG. 415 (2004).
145 17 U.S.C. § 115. Such exception was also included in the UK Copyright Act of 1911
and in the 1956 Act, but it was not retained in the 1988 Act. A compulsory license in such
cases is permitted under Article 13 of the Berne Convention. See also J.A.L. STERLING,
WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW 2.106 (2d ed. 2003).
141 17 U.S.C. §I 11. A compulsory license in regard to the broadcasting and cable
retransmission rights of authors is allowed under Article I Ibis (2) of the Beme Convention.
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programming code and translation of its forms (decompilation) if it is
"indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve the
interoperability of an independently created computer program."' 147  A
similar exception for reverse engineering of computer programs exists in
the United States. 148  A number of exceptions from the general right to
exclude have been recognized by the TRIPS agreement. 1
49
Fine tuning IP law is not an easy task. In an ideal world, patents
would not be granted unless the invention or the work would not have been
commercialized or disclosed during the time of exclusivity. 150 This is not
always the case. Poor patent quality, patent thickets, and defensive
patenting are a reality in some industries.' 15  Questionable IPRs may give
rise to significant competitive concerns, and they may also obstruct
innovation. Sham litigation can paralyze technological process for years.
IPRs may erect barriers to entry to a market. Agreements involving IPRs
may affect competition. Dominant companies may use their IPRs in an
anticompetitive manner and prevent new products from coming into the
market.
The key question is whether and how antitrust should intervene
when IPRs give rise to such problems. The mainstream view is that IP and
antitrust laws should work in unison to maximize wealth by promoting
innovation and economic progress. 152  This implies that IPRs are not
147 Article 6 of the Council Directive 91/250/EEC on the legal protection of computer
programs, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42.
148 See, e.g., DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1183,
affd on other grounds, 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996) (ruling that reverse engineering, to
access unprotected functional elements of computer programs, constitutes a fair use under
§ 107 of the Copyright Act). The court held that a telecommunications equipment
manufacturer's intermediate copying of firmware embedded in a competitor's
microprocessor cards is "copying" but constitutes a fair use.
149Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of IPRs (TRIPs). See also Gianna Julian-Arnold,
International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and the Reality, 33 IDEA 349, 372-95
(1993) (surveying adoption of TRIPS provisions); Donna M. Glitter, International
Conflicts Over the Patenting of Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the
European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exception, 76
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1623 (2001). The TRIPS Agreement provides also for the possibility of
compulsory licensing in antitrust cases, preserving the broad discretion of national
authorities to order compulsory licensing in antitrust cases. See Jean-Franqois Bellis, EC
Competition Law remedies and TRIPS: Limitations on the Use of Compulsory Licensing as
a Competition Law Remedy, in MICHAEL HUTCHINGS & MADS ANDENAS, COMPETITION
LAW YEARBOOK 185 (2002).
150 This reflects the rationale for granting IP protection, the benefit the society obtains in
exchange for granting exclusivity. See, e.g., Luis Kaplow, The Patent Antitrust
Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1815, 1825-29.
151 See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited:
An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry (1979-1995), 32
RAND J. EcoN. 101 (2001) (finding that large-scale manufacturers of semiconductors were
involved in patent portfolio races).
152 The idea was first proposed in WARD BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL (1973) and has been embraced by the academia, for
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immune from antitrust intervention, but also that the special features of
IPRs must be taken into account when antitrust law is applied to them.
Though IP confers specific rights, there may be some ambiguity as to their
scope. Antitrust may be used as a tool to define the scope of IPRs. Yet,
application of antitrust law to IPRs may result in under- or over-
enforcement. Careful balancing is necessary, as over-enforcement of
antitrust laws may undermine the objectives of IP.
Though IP and antitrust law do not have conflicting aims, they strive
to achieve them by different and sometimes conflicting means. 153 Antitrust
law seeks to foster competition by constraining the way monopoly power is
created and maintained. IP may in some cases permit or even encourage
monopoly to create incentives to innovate. IPRs are granted in unique
goods and it is possible that they are used to obtain unwarranted market
power and interfere with competition in various ways. In particular, overly
broad IPRs can have a negative effect on competition; they may also inhibit
innovation. Under some circumstances, tensions between these two
branches of law are bound to occur. For many years courts and
commentators have struggled to define what constitutes a legitimate
exercise of IPRs and what type of conduct involving IP should be deemed
illegal under antitrust laws. The intersection between IP and antitrust has
been characterized by periods of over and under enforcement, in which first
antitrust was trumping and then IP gained ground. 154 Striking the balance
between antitrust and IP requires taking into account static and dynamic
efficiency considerations. 155  Static efficiency focuses on present market
example, Lewis Anton & Dennis Yao, Some Reflections on the Antitrust Treatment of IP,
63 ANTITRUST L.J. 603 (1995); 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL, supra note 35, 1.3; Luc Peeperkorn
& Emil Paulis, Competition and Innovation: Two Horses Pulling the Same Cart, in PAUL
LUGARD & LEIGH HANCHER, ON THE MERITS: CURRENT ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND
POLICY (2005), as well as antitrust enforcers, for example, Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo
of America, Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron
Corp. 713 F.2d 782, 786 (C.A.Fed.,1983); and EU Guidelines on the Transfer of
Technology, supra note 38, 7.
153 SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981) ("The conflict between
the antitrust and patent laws arises in the methods they embrace that were designed to
achieve reciprocal goals "); see also I HOVENKAMP ET AL, supra note 35, 1.3b.
154 For an overview of the history of the interaction between antitrust and IP see I
HOVENKAMP ET AL, supra note 35, 1.3b (in the U.S.); Abbott B. Lipsky, To the Edge:
Maintaining Incentives for Innovation After Global Antitrust Explosions, 35 GEO. J. INT'L
LAW 521, 523-30 (2004) (in the U.S.); Valentine Korah, The Interface Between IP and
Antitrust: The European Experience, 69 ANTITRUST L.J 801, 802-08 (2002); Ian S.
Forrester, European Competition Law and IP, in proceedings of the Twelfth St. Gallen
International Competition Law Forum, University of St. Gallen (April 28-29, 2005).
155 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 150, at 1821-23, 1829-33 (proposing a test that balances
profits derived by the patentee from a given practice and the monopoly loss inflicted on the
society); Janusz A. Ordover, A Patent System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 43, 42-44 (1991); 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL, supra note 35, l.3a (arguing that the key
to economic efficiency lies in balancing the social benefit of providing economic incentives
for creation and the costs of limiting the diffusion of knowledge).
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terms and its main concern is the level of prices. It mandates that
knowledge-assets are readily available for anyone who is willing to pay the
marginal costs of dissemination, which implies that property rights in such
assets should be minimal and owners of such assets should be forced to
share them with competing companies as a means to lower the prices.
Dynamic efficiency, on the other hand, is concerned with long-term effects,
such as the level of innovation, the development of new products and
services and the pace of technological progress. Innovation brings better
products, more choice for consumers, and lower prices. Thus, even if it can
be established that IP involves static inefficiency, it is socially desirable if
the ex ante incentives to innovate due to the additional reward are
sufficiently great. 156 Long-term efficiencies are particularly important in
the context of technology driven industries. In these industries IPRs may be
critical for innovation. It has been argued that the importance of IP for
innovation in the context of a particular industry should be taken into
account for the purpose of antitrust scrutiny. 157  IPRs that are of poor
quality or that are too broad can be harmful also in the long run, as they
obstruct dissemination of information and impair technological progress.
The value of the IPR at stake, the scope of protection afforded under IP
legislation, and its importance in the context of a particular industry is not
without consequence for the application of antitrust rules.
There seems to be some agreement among commentators as to what
types of agreements involving IP are anticompetitive. Moreover, after the
EU adopted the new Technology Transfer Regulation 158 and the Guidelines
on the Transfer of Technology, 5 9 the European Commission's position on
restrictions in licensing agreements was brought closer to U.S. standards.
60
156 Kaplow, supra note 150, at 1821-23.
157 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L.
REv. 761, 813-15 (2002); Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper
Balance of Competition Law and Patent Policy [hereinafter FTC Report] (Oct. 2003), ch.
1, http://www.ftc.gov /opa/2003 /10 /cpreport.htm.
151 Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of
Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements, 2004 O.J. (L
123) 11.
159 Commission Notice - Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to
technology transfer agreements, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 2.
160 There is a consensus as it comes to the basic principles, but there are still some
important differences between American and European regulations applicable to
technology licensing. See, e.g., Makan Delrahim, The Long and Winding Road:
Convergence in the Application of Antitrust to IP, remarks presented at the George Mason
Law Review Symposium (Oct. 6 2004),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/205712.htm. For a comment on the new
European regulations on IP licensing see Erik Vollebregt, The New Technology Transfer
Block Exemption: From Straitjacket to Moving Targets, 10 COMPUTER & TELECOMM. L.
REV. 123 (2004); Frank Fine, The EU's New Antitrust Rules for Technology Licensing: A
Turbulent Harbour for Licensors, 29 EUR. L. REv. 766 (2004); William E. Kovacic &
Andreas P. Reindl, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Improving Competition Policy and
Intellectual Property Policy, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1062, 1070-73 (2005).
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This can hardly be said about potentially anticompetitive unilateral conduct
relating to IPRs. As discussed above, the standards for condemning
unilateral practices are different in Europe and in the United States. To be
sure, this has had a significant impact on the way unilateral practices that
involve the use of IPRs are assessed in these two jurisdictions. 161  But
perhaps a more important question is whether antitrust authorities see a role
for themselves in curbing IPRs, when they become a source of competitive
concerns. Antitrust law limits the freedom of IP owners in many different
ways, but the focus of this article is cases where the attack on IP is direct
and deprives the rights holder of exclusivity, the essence of all IPRs. This
essentially happens if enforcement of an IPR as such constitutes an antitrust
violation, or if antitrust law mandates forced sharing of IP. Can refusal to
license violate antitrust law? Can IP be an essential facility? Should
antitrust law be concerned with the poor quality of IPRs? Cases in which
courts tackled these questions involve a true conflict between IP law and
trade regulation. They are also among the most controversial antitrust
disputes.
A. WHEN DOES ANTITRUST INTERVENE?
When does unilateral conduct involving IP violate antitrust laws?
There seems to be a number of theories which appear prominently in the
cases and in the literature on both sides of the Atlantic: (1) the right is
invalid; (2) the IP at stake has been improvidently defined or granted; (3)
the IP owner attempts to extend its right beyond the scope warranted by IP
laws; (4) the IP held by a dominant company constitutes an "essential
facility", access to which is indispensable for the existence of viable
competition on the market; (5) special rules may apply when the refusal
concerns interoperability information. The section below examines the
relevant European and American case law concerning unilateral conduct
involving IPRs. It analyzes the way in which specific anticompetitive
concerns are addressed in these two jurisdictions, the differences in the
prevailing theories and traces their roots in the diverging principles of
antitrust law.
1. Europe: Intellectual Property as an Essential Facility
As it has been said above, the European law concerning abuse of a
dominant position and refusal to deal is in the state of flux. The same is
true for rules applicable to unilateral refusals to license. The case law is
scarce and many questions have been left open. However, two key
observations can be made. One is that the ECJ's jurisprudence seems to
gravitate towards a more restrictive reading of the obligations of dominant
161 Kovacic & Reindl, supra note 160, at 1082-83.
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companies to share their IP. The very same line of the development can be
observed in the case law concerning unilateral refusals to deal. The second
is that the European Commission seems to see a larger scope of antitrust
intervention and prefers not to be bound by formalistic tests, but rather to be
able to base its decision on all the circumstances of a case.
But let us start from the beginning. The first cases involving using
IPRs to strengthen monopoly power concerned spare parts and independent
repairers, a situation that may be familiar to American readers. In
162 6Volvo/Veng and Renault63 , the ECJ was faced with the question of
whether a refusal to grant a license for the import and sale of car spare parts
can constitute an abuse of a dominant position. In both cases, the original
car manufacturer, relying on its IPRs, prevented repairers from producing or
importing spare parts produced elsewhere without the authority of the car
manufacturer. The ECJ replied that the right to exclude was the "substance
of the exclusive right, and that a refusal to grant such a license cannot in
itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position." 164 In Renault, the Court
added that the fact that the original manufacturers charge a higher price for
the parts than the independent producers did not "necessarily constitute an
abuse, since the proprietor of protective rights in respect of an ornamental
design may lawfully call for a return on the amounts which he has invested
in order to perfect the protected design." 165 The Court noted, however, that
a refusal to license may violate Article 82 if it involves an additional
element of an abusive conduct, such as "an arbitrary refusal to deliver spare
parts to independent repairers, the fixing of prices for spare parts at an
unfair level or a decision no longer to produce spare parts for a particular
model even though many cars of that model remain in circulation."
In Magill,166 the ECJ had an occasion to elaborate on the
circumstances that could make a refusal to deal abusive. Magill TV Guide
Ltd. published weekly TV guides in Ireland and Northern Ireland containing
listings of RTE, BBC, ITV, the major Irish TV stations. The latter
published their own TV guides in the form of weekly periodicals. The
listings were copyrighted, but they also distributed schedules of their
television programs free of charge to newspapers and other media.
167
Magill began publishing a comprehensive weekly listing, containing the
programs of major Irish TV stations for the following week. The TV
stations sued for copyright infringement and an Irish court issued an interim
162 Case 238/87, Volvo AB v. Erik Veng (U.K.) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211.
163 Case 53/87, Consorzio italiano della componentistica di ricambio per autoveicoli and
Maxicar v Rdgie nationale des usines Renault, 1988 E.C.R. 6039.
164 Volvo/Veng, 1988 E.C.R. 6211, 8.; see also Renault, 1988 E.C.R. 6039, 15-16.
165 Renault, 1988 E.C.R. 6039, 17.
166 Case T-69/89, RTE v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 11-485, upheld on appeal by the ECJ
in joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. I-
743.
167 The license was subject to the condition that there should only be reference to programs
intended to be broadcast within the next 24 hours (or 48 hours, in the case of weekends).
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injunction restraining Magill from publishing weekly program listings.
Magill, on its part, lodged a complaint to the Commission alleging that the
refusal to license constituted an abuse of a dominant position. The
Commission agreed with the complainant and decided that by preventing
the publication of the comprehensive weekly TV guide, the TV stations
abused their dominant position in the market for their individual advance
weekly program listings. 16  It ordered the infringement to cease by
imposing a compulsory license on the TV stations concerned. The
Commission's Decision was upheld by the CFI and, on appeal, by the ECJ.
The ECJ stressed that mere ownership of an IPR does not confer a dominant
position, 169 and a unilateral refusal to license could not in itself constitute an
abuse of a dominant position. 170 The Court rejected the argument that a
refusal to license a copyright should be considered per se legal. 171 It found
that the TV stations possessed a de facto monopoly over the information
necessary to compile TV listings; 172 they were "the only source of
information on program scheduling which is the indispensable raw material
for compiling a weekly television guide."'173 The refusal to license was
abusive because it 1) prevented the appearance of a new product (a
comprehensive weekly TV listings), which the TV stations did not offer and
for which there was a potential consumer demand, 2) there was no
justification for the refusal (the Court did not elaborate further on this point)
and 3) by refusing to license Magill and other such companies, the TV
stations reserved for themselves the secondary market of weekly television
guides by excluding all competition from the market. 174 The Court upheld
the remedy imposed on the TV stations by the Commission: a compulsory
license with the right to charge reasonable and non-discriminatory royalties.
The Magill Court left a number of burning questions open. It was
not clear whether the list of conditions under which a refusal to license
violates Article 82 was exhaustive, nor whether the conditions listed by the
CFI and the ECJ were cumulative or alternative. Although some
commentators understood Magill as a leveraging case and the ECJ
judgment as prohibiting a refusal to license that has anticompetitive effects
"other than those that would be caused in the market primarily protected by
168 Though the Court upheld the market definition and the finding of dominance on the
relevant market, an interesting question is whether such a narrow market definition was
correct. The question is particularly interesting taken the fact that the Court explicitly
rejected the possibility that a dominant position could be implied from the possession of an
IP right (see below).
169 See Magill, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, 46.
17o Id. at 49.
171 Id. at 48.
172 Id. at 47.
173 Id, at53.
174 Id. at 54-56.
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the IPRs,''175 most commentators explained the case in terms of a corrective
measure applied to questionable national IP laws. 176 Although the Court
failed to comment on the value of the IPRs at stake, the condition relating to
the lack of justification could be understood as referring to the fact that the
broadcasters made little investment in the development of the listings, and a
compulsory license would not be a real disincentive to continue their
publishing activities. 177 If the poor quality of copyright at stake were not a
decisive factor under Magill, the holder of an improvement patent might be
able to routinely require the holder of a basic patent to grant a license under
the basic patent. 178  Magill seems to make sense in terms of the
idea/expression dichotomy, as the copyrighted subject matter was ancillary
to the real inputs: the TV program information needed by Magill. 179  The
TV listings were also a by-product of the TV stations' core business.
Another factor not discussed by the ECJ, but noted by the CFI,' 80 which
clearly might have had a bearing was discrimination: the same TV listings
were given free of charge to newspapers who published TV listings on a
daily basis. 181 All these factors seem to have played a role in the Court's
reasoning. I submit that Magill is best understood as a case in which the
Court questioned the existence of an IP right, which it did not consider
175 John Temple-Lang, European Community Antitrust Law: Innovation Markets and High
Technology Industries, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 717, 730 (1997).
17T V listings are not protected by copyright in most EU Member States. See e.g., JONES
& SUFRIN, supra note 32, at 404, 407; Forrester, supra note 126, Maurits Dolmans,
Restrictions on Innovation: An EU Antitrust Approach, 88 ANTITRUST L.J. 455, 470
(1998); Valentine Korah, The Interface between IP and Antitrust: The European
Experience, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 801, 810-13 (2002); Christopher Stothers, The End of
Exclusivity? Abuse of IPRs in the EU, 24 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 86, 92-93 (2002).
177Opinion of AG Jacobs in Bronner, 1998 ECR 1-7791, 63; Dolmans, supra note 176;
Forrester, supra note 126; Korah, supra note 176, 811. It is worth noting that the U.S.
Supreme Court held that that bits of information that were not selected, coordinated, or
arranged in an original way did not meet constitutional or statutory requirements for
copyright protection. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S.
340, 361-64 (1991).
178 JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 32, at 404; Korah, supra note 176, at 811.
179 The idea/expression dichotomy prevents copyright from monopolizing information and
ideas, and leaves these essential resources in the public domain. See, e.g., P. Bert
Hugenholtz, Abuse of Database Right: Sole-Source Information Banks under the EU
Database Directive, in FRANQOIS LEVIQUE & HOWARD SHELANSKI, ANTITRUST, PATENT
AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND U.S. PERSPECTIVES 203 (2005); Burton Ong, Anticompetitive
Refusals to Grant Copyright Licenses: Reflections on the IMS Saga, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 505, 506-07 (2004).
"' Case T-69/89 Magill, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, 46-47, 73. See also the CFI judgment in
504/93 Tierc6 Ladbroke SA v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. 11-923, 124-30 (finding that
there was no discrimination in a situation where a refusal to license concerned a separate
geographic market where the owner of IPRs did not exploit these rights on its own account
of by granting access to a third party).
181 Forrester, supra note 126; Nicholas Green, IP and the Abuse of Dominant Position
under European Union Law: Existence, Exercise and the Evaporation of Rights, 20
BROOK. J. INT'L L 141, 146 (1993).
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reasonable in terms of providing an incentive to creative efforts. Notably,
the case coincided with the adoption of the Broadcasting Act in Britain,
which provided for compulsory licensing of program listings. 112  With
respect to ECJ case law, an analogy may be drawn to Hofrer, 183 where the
Court effectively outlawed national legislation giving exclusivity over job
brokerage services to a state employment agency. The Court held that
granting an exclusive right is not incompatible with Article 82 as such, but
it may violate EU competition law if the company in that position cannot
avoid abusing its dominant position merely by exercising the exclusive
rights granted to it. In Hofner, this condition was met because the state
employment agency was not capable of meeting the demand for executive
recruitment. In Magill, the exclusivity granted to the TV stations
effectively allowed them to prevent the emergence of a new, useful product.
However, as the history shows, instead of dwelling on these concepts, the
ECJ has analyzed unilateral refusals to license using the framework of the
essential facilities theory.
The rulings that followed Magill resolved some, but not all, of these
controversies. In Ladbroke, both the Commission 184 and the CFI narrowed
Magill to the effect that a refusal to license could be abusive only if the
service required was either essential for the exercise of the activity in the
downstream market, in that there was no real or potential substitute, or if it
concerned a new product or service for which there was "specific, constant
and regular demand."' 185 The Court also stressed the importance of the
presence of the IP owner in the downstream market. 186 Oscar Bronner,
discussed above, was another blow to the broad reading of the Court's
jurisprudence imposing a duty to deal on dominant companies. Invoking
Magill, the ECJ held that a refusal to deal may be abusive only if it is both
indispensable for carrying out the rival's business and capable of
eliminating all competition on the part of undertaking seeking access.
Twelve years after Magill, the Court had the opportunity to revisit
unilateral refusals to license in the IMS case."' As in Magill, at stake was
the scope of a copyright covering the so-called "brick structure". IMS
182 See JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 32, at 403, n.242.
183 Case C-41/90 Klaus Hofner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1979,
28-31.
184 Ladbroke, a company operating betting services on horse races, filed a complaint with
Commission alleging that the refusal to supply its outlets with television pictures and
commentary on French horse races constituted an abuse of a dominant position. Ladbroke
alleged that the company that refused the license was dominant in the market for
transmission of French horse races, there was no substitute for the requested service, the
refusal to supply its outlets was unjustified, and that its sole purpose was to restrict
competition. The Commission rejected the complaint.
... Case 504/93 Tierc6 Ladbroke SA v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. 11-923, 131.186 Id. 133.
117 Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG
(IMS), 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039.
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Health, a company engaged in tracking sales of pharmaceutical products,
worked together with its clients to devise a "brick structure", a geographical
division of Germany based largely on post code zones. The brick structure
was available free of charge to pharmacies, doctors and associations of
health insurance schemes. It has become a de facto industry standard and
IMS' rivals found it impossible to market the pharmaceutical data other
than by using structures similar to that created by IMS. To prevent them
from doing so, IMS brought proceedings before a German court alleging a
copyright infringement. The national courts found that the brick structure
was protected as a database under German copyright law and issued an
interim order restraining IMS' rivals from using any form of the brick
structure derived from the one designed by IMS. The competitors requested
a license for the duration of the proceedings, but their request was denied.
Thus they lodged a complaint with the Commission alleging that IMS
abused its dominant position. The Commission, relying on the essential
facilities theory, issued an interim measures decision finding that IMS'
refusal to license violated Article 82.1" It found that the refusal was
unjustified and likely to eliminate all competition in the downstream
market, and that the license was indispensable because there was no actual
or potential substitute in existence for the requested service. 189 The EU
Courts suspended the decision, but did not review the substantive issues
raised by it. 190 The case reached the ECJ again through a request for a
preliminary reference in national proceedings before a German court.
The IMSjudgment is so far the most comprehensive pronouncement
of the ECJ on unilateral refusals to license. The Court began its reasoning
by confirming the presumption that a refusal to license is legal, even if it is
the act of a dominant company. Only exceptional circumstances can make
it abusive. 191 Combining Magill and Bronner, the Court held that a refusal
to license by a dominant company is abusive if four cumulative conditions
are met: 1) the protected product or service is indispensable to compete in a
particular market; 2) the refusal is "such as to exclude any competition on a
secondary market"; 3) the refusal prevents the emergence of a new product
for which there is potential consumer demand; and 4) the refusal is not
objectively justified. 192 The Court left open the question of whether these
conditions are necessary or merely sufficient for finding that a refusal to
license violates Article 82. The Court refers to these conditions as being
188 Commission Decision 2002/165/EC of 3 July 2001 (NDC Health/IMS Health: Interim
Measures), 2002 O.J. (L 59) 18.
189 Id. 70-74.
'9' Case T-184/01 R, IMS Health v. Commission, 2001 E.C.R. 11-3193, upheld, Case C-
481 /01 P(R) NDC Health Corporation and NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG v. IMS Health
Inc. and Commission, 2002 E.C.R. 1-3401. The original decision was withdrawn by
Commission Decision 2003 /741 /EC of 13 August 2003 (NDC Health/IMS Health: Interim
Measures), 2003 O.J. (L 268) 69.
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"sufficient", yet its interpretation of the indispensability and new product
criteria indicates that at least these criteria may be both sufficient and
necessary.193 The ECJ's determination of this issue will be pivotal for the
outcome of the Microsoft litigation.
The ECJ confirmed the narrow definition of indispensability
adopted in Bronner: the requested service or product would be deemed
indispensable only if an equally efficient competitor of the company that
controls the existing product or service could not produce it. 194  The
participation of the pharmaceutical industry and its dependency on the brick
structure was relevant for the assessment of indispensability. 195  The
condition relating to the likelihood of excluding all competition on the
secondary market implies that the upstream market for the requested
product or service and the secondary market, on which the product or
service in question is used for the production of another product or the
supply of another service, must be identified. 196 The Court agreed with the
Advocate General that this condition is fulfilled if a potential or
hypothetical secondary market could be identified. 197 Some commentators
point out that the requirement of eliminating all competition is closely
linked, if not identical, with the requirement of indispensability, as
interpreted by the ECJ.198 Indeed, in the U.S., showing that a facility is
essential to a competitor involves demonstrating that the facility is critical
to the plaintiffs own competitive viability, 199 and that it is vital to
200
enhancing competition in general. It seems that the IMS Court's reading
of the requirements of indispensability and foreclosure of the competition in
the downstream market does not support this proposition. The Court's
interpretation of the condition that all competition in the secondary market
should be eliminated limits application of a refusal to license to leveraging
cases. It adds to the condition of "indispensability" the requirement that
two markets must be identified. There is more of a case for antitrust
intervention when the exclusivity enjoyed by a rights holder in one market
is used to exclude competition in a second, vertically related market, thus
forcing a potential market entrant to attack the monopolist simultaneously
193 Christian Ahlborn, David S. Evans, & Jorge Padilla, The Logic and Limits of the
'Exceptional Circumstances Test' in Magil and IMS Health, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1109,
1127-28 (2005).
194 IMS, 2001 E.C.R. 11-3193, 1 28.
195 Id. 29.
196 Id. 42.
197 Id. 44; Opinion of AG Tizzano in IMS, 2001 E.C.R. 11-3193, 1 56-59.
'9' See note 113 and accompanying text (discussing Bronner); see also, Net Le, What Does
'Capable of Eliminating All Competition' Mean, 26 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 6, 6-7
(2005) (arguing that this criterion is identical to the criterion of indispensability).
'99 See, e.g., Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539 (7th Cir.1986); TCA Bldg. Co.
v. Northwestern Resources Co., 873 F.Supp. 29, 39 (S.D.Tex. 1995); 3A AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, 773a, 773b.
200 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, 773b3.
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in two separate markets. 20 1 In this context, it is concerning that the Court
held that a separate market for IP could be defined even if IP was never sold
separately, but used only as an input in the development of another product.
This interpretation points to the conclusion that the two market condition
will always be satisfied, as nearly all types of IP could potentially be
marketed as a stand-alone item.20 2  Also, for the purpose of assessing
indispensability, the ECJ takes into account factors that may or may not
weigh on the possibility of excluding competition in the secondary market.
For example, the Court felt it was relevant for the purpose of assessing
indispensability whether clients were involved in the development of an
essential facility.
20 3
A compulsory license may be granted only if the requesting
company intends to produce new goods or services not offered by the owner
of the right and for which there is a potential consumer demand.20 4
Whether the new product test is right from an economic perspective is
205debatable. To my mind, the new product requirement can be a reasonable
limiting principle, as long as the requirement is strictly interpreted. The
IMS Court held that the new product must be sufficiently different from
products available on the market and that they satisfy consumer demand
that the existing products failed to provide for. This says little about the
degree of novelty that is required from the "new product". From an
economic perspective, the key issue in this context is whether the new
product could be a substitute for the product offered by the IP holder.
Advocate General Tizzano advised the Court that it is sufficient that the
new product is of a "different nature" than the product available on the
market and that it does not exclude the possibility that the new product is in
201 Paul D. Marquardt & Mark Leddy, The Essential Facilities Doctrine and Intellectual
Property Rights: A Response to Pit@fsky, Patterson, and Hooks, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 847,
850-52 (2003).
202 Geradin, supra note 9, at 1530.
203 Customer participation in the creation of IP is not necessarily an indication of
anticompetitive conduct. See, e.g., Donna M. Gitter, Strong Medicine for Competition Ills:
The Judgment of the European Court of Justice in the IMS Health Action and its
Implications for Microsoft Corporation, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 153, 178-80 (2004).
204 IMS, 2001 E.C.R. 11-3193, 48-49.
201 See, e.g., Ahlbom, Evans & Padilla, supra note 193, (arguing that the new product test
is in line with economic theory); David S. Evans & A Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust
Rules for Assessing Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 73,
87-88 (2005); Ian S. Forrester, Regulating Intellectual Property via Competition? Or
Regulating Competition via Intellectual Property? Competition and Intellectual Property:
Ten Years on, the Debate Still Flourishes, proceedings of the Tenth Annual EU
Competition Law and Policy Workshop, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies,
European University Institute, Florence, Italy (June 3-4, 2005) (suggesting that the new
product test makes sense from "an orthodox antitrust point of view"). But see
Eilmansberger, supra note 7, at 158-59; Geradin, supra note 9, at 1531-32; Derek Ridyard,
Compulsory Access Under EC Competition Law A New Doctrine of 'Convenient
Facilities' and the Case for Price Regulation, supra note 9, at 670.
2006-2007
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competition with the products offered by the IP holder.2 6 The Court did
not embrace his position, leaving the question of substitutability open. In
my opinion, the new product and the product offered by the IP holder
should not be in direct competition with one another. Allowing compulsory
licensing in such situations inevitably decreases the reward obtained by the
IP holder and thus the incentives to invest. If the products at stake are not
close substitutes, the IP holder can still exploit his own invention, but will
be prevented from forestalling technological progress. It is not enough that
the company requesting access to IP offers a somewhat modified version of
the product that is already on the market; it must be able to prove that the
access to IP is needed to commercialize an important innovation. Thus,
antitrust may be used ex post to define the scope of IPRs, assuming a refusal
to license. To be sure, the scope of IPRs should be ex ante clarified under
applicable IP laws so that they do not paralyze follow-on innovation. Yet
where overly broad IPRs create competitive concerns, antitrust may be used
as a remedy.
Admittedly, compulsory licensing in such cases may affect the
incentives of the IP holder to invest in product development. Yet this
would be offset by increased incentives to invest on the part of the
competitor, which has proved that it is better placed to do so, by building on
the dominant company's innovations. The new product test interpreted in
such a way will be a forward looking test designed to accommodate
dynamic efficiency considerations. It will also limit the risk of over-
enforcement. It has the additional advantages of being feasible to
administer by antitrust enforcers and providing a degree of legal certainty.
IMS illustrates a trend in the Court's case law to set higher standards
for compulsory licensing under Article 82. By making the conditions
cumulative, the ECJ applied a higher standard than the CFI in Ladbroke. It
is worth noting that the Court based its reasoning exclusively on refusal to
license cases, thus suggesting that a higher standard is applicable to refusals
to license as compared to other types of refusals to deal.2 °7 Unlike the
Commission, the Court held that the essential facilities doctrine cannot be
applied to IP simply because rival firms are not capable of competing with
the product incorporating IP. The balance of interest tips in favor of IP
unless there is complete foreclosure of the secondary market and where the
refusal to license prevents the emergence of a new product for which there
is a potential consumer demand. A dominant company will be forced to
share its IP only if it uses IP to forestall innovation. It is not enough, the
Court stressed, that the company that requested the license essentially
duplicates the goods or services already offered on the secondary market by
the owner of an IPR.
206 Opinion of AG Tizzano in IMS, 2001 E.C.R. 11-3193, 62.
207 See, e.g., Forrester, supra note 205; Humpe & Ritter, supra note 120, at 142-47.
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Unfortunately, IMS does not shed light on the relevance of the value
and scope of IPRs at stake. In both Magill and IMS competitive concerns
resulted from the breadth of copyright protection. The scope of copyright
over the brick structure was contestable and in the course of litigation
German courts found a solution based in copyright law to address the
competitive concerns arising from IMS' refusal to license. 20 8  The EU
Database Directive,2 09 the source of the German copyright provisions
applicable to the IMS' brick structure, specifically instructs the Commission
to examine whether the right granted in a database has led to an abuse of a
dominant position or other interference with free competition that would
justify introduction of compulsory licensing provisions. Moreover, the
original draft directive contained a compulsory licensing provision, 
2 1
which was eventually replaced with a provision allowing Member States to
introduce limited exceptions to the database right.211 In IMS, as in Magill,
the main source of competition concerns was overly broad copyright
protection. 212  It is unclear whether the ECJ would apply its "essential
208 Although the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court on appeal upheld the finding that IMS'
brick structure was protected under German copyright law and that direct reproduction of
IMS' structure was illegal, it found that IMS' competitors "could not simply be prohibited
from developing freely and independently a brick structure that is similarly [to the IMS'
structure] based on a breakdown by district, urban district and post-code district and for
that reason comprise more or less the same number of bricks .... In particular, the defendant
or third parties could not be expected to produce a data structure that does not sufficiently
satisfy the practical requirements simply in order to keep as much distance as possible from
the plaintiffs product. Instead, variations cannot be demanded where the overlaps are based
on material technical requirements and, in the light taking into account 'the need of
availability' for competitors, the appropriate performance of the technical task depends on
these features." Commission Decision 2003/741/EC of 13 August 2003 (NDC Health/IMS
Health: Interim Measures), 2003 O.J. (L 268) 69, 10. The Commission found that as a
result of this ruling IMS' competitors were able to devise a structure that allowed them to
compete with IMS and that the ruling coincided with the improvement of their market
position.
209 Council Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 [hereinafter Database
Directive].
2 Art. 8(1) of the draft Directive provided that "[n]otwithstanding the right provided for in
Article 2(5) to prevent the unauthorized extraction and re-utilization of the contents of a
database, if the works or materials contained in a database which is made publicly available
cannot be independently created, collected or obtained from any other source, the right to
extract and re-utilize, in whole or substantial part, works or materials from that database for
commercial purposes, shall be licensed on fair and non-discriminatory terms." Council
Communication, 1992 O.J. (C. 156) 9.
211 See Database Directive, art. 9. For the discussion of legislative history of the Database
Directive see Mark Powell, The European Union's Database Directive: An International
Antidote to the Side Effects ofFeist?, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1215 (1997).
212 No IPR protection exists under U.S. law for databases, and efforts to introduce similar
protection have not been successful. The EU sui generis database right can confer
substantial market power on producers of single source data that can be exploited in
downstream markets for derivative products and services. The ECJ addressed this problem
by curbing the database right in case C-46/02 Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. Oy Veikkaus AB,
2004 E.C.R. 1-10365. See generally Hugenholtz, supra note 129; P. Bernt Hugenholtz &
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facilities plus" approach to a valid patent. It is reasonable to expect that the
value of IP at stake and the cost of research and development could be
considered as an "objective justification" for a refusal to license.
2. Microsoft: A New Paradigm?
In Section 2 above the Bronner Court's restrictive reading of the
obligation to deal was contrasted with the Commission's approach
exemplified by the Clearstream Decision and the Article 82 Paper. Similar
observations can be made with respect to the treatment of refusals to
license. The Commission's position on unilateral refusals to license is best
exemplified by the Microsoft Decision, 213 which was adopted just a month
before the IMS judgment was handed down. The Commission concluded
that Microsoft abused its dominant position in the PC operating systems
market by refusing to supply "interoperability information" 214 necessary for
Microsoft's rivals to be able to effectively compete in the workgroup server
operating market. In this context, it is important to distinguish between the
work group server operating system and the Windows client PC operating
system. Only the latter constitutes a de facto industry standard. In the
Commission's view, the refusal to license allowed Microsoft to leverage its
dominant position in the client PC operating systems market into the market
for workgroup server operating systems, and ultimately, to preserve its
monopoly in the market for PC operating systems. 215 Microsoft's strategy
consisted in particular of preserving privileged connections between its
Windows PC operating system and its work group server operating system
to the detriment of its competitors in the work group server operating
market.
The Commission Decision was preceded by a settlement that
concluded an antitrust case against Microsoft in the United States, under
which Microsoft had been obliged to license specifications for the
communication protocols used by the Windows server operating system to
make it compatible with Windows Client PC operating systems. 216  The
Mark J. Davison, Football Rights, Horse Races, and Spin-offs: the ECJ domesticates the
database right, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 13 (2005).
213 Commission Decision in Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft [hereinafter Microsoft
Decision].
214 The Commission defined "interoperability information" as "the complete and accurate
specifications for all the Protocols implemented in Windows Work Group Server Operating
Systems and... used by Windows Work Group Servers to deliver file and print services and
group user administration services, including Windows Domain Controller services, Active
Directory services and Group Policy services, to Windows Work Group Networks"
Microsoft Decision, supra note 213, art. 1. The interoperability information concerned both
server-to-server and server-to-client communication.
215 Microsoft Decision, supra note 213, 185-279.
216 Under Section III.E of the US settlement "Microsoft shall make available for use by
third parties, for the sole purpose of interoperating or communicating with a Windows
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Commission, however, considered that these disclosures were insufficient
to remedy competitive concerns it had identified. It stressed that the US
settlement was not "specifically targeted at work group server operating
system vendors" and did not address issues beyond the scope of the US
antitrust case. In particular, the disclosures under the US settlement were
"strictly limited by Microsoft to client-to-server communication" and did
not "cover server-to-server protocols that are functionally related to the
client PC., 217 Thus, whereas the U.S. settlement addressed the client-to-
server interoperability issue, the EU case against Microsoft focused on
server-to-server interoperability. Arguably, this fact weakens the leverage
theory, as the refusal to license and its effects occurred in the same market:
the market for server operating systems. 218
The second prong of the Commission's case against Microsoft was
tying of media functionality (Windows Media Player) and the Windows PC
operating system.219 As a remedy for the first infringement, Microsoft was
ordered to license proprietary information concerning the communications
protocols 220 by which Microsoft's server operating systems communicate
with one another. Microsoft maintains that the information it was asked to
disclose was covered by patents, copyrights and trade secrecy. As a remedy
for the second infringement, Microsoft had to develop a "fully-functioning"
version of Windows without Media Player and offer it to customers in
Europe.221 The two abuses identified by the Commission were penalized by
a fine amounting to £497 million, the largest in competition law history.
The Microsoft Decision has many fascinating aspects, one of which
is the test adopted by the Commission for the assessment of unilateral
refusals to license, a test that is markedly different from the IMS test. The
Commission starts from the established premise that only in exceptional
circumstances may the exercise of an IPR by the proprietor involve abusive
conduct. It reasons that IP should be treated as other forms of property for
Operating System Product, on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms [...], any
Communications Protocol that is [...] (i) implemented in a Windows Operating System
Product installed on a client computer, and (ii) used to interoperate, or communicate,
natively (i.e., without the addition of software code to the client operating system product)
with a Microsoft server operating system product." New York v. Microsoft, 224 F.Supp.2d
76, 269 (D.D.C.,2002).
217 Microsoft Decision, supra note 213, 273-79, 703-08.
218 See e.g., Roberto Pardolesi & Andrea Renda, The European Commission's Case against
Microsoft: Kill Bill?, 27 WORLD COMPETITION 513, 547-49 (2004).
219 Microsoft Decision, supra note 213, 792-813.
220 Protocols are defined as "a set of rules of interconnection and interaction between
various instances of Windows Group Server Operating Systems and Windows Client PC
Operating Systems running on different computers in a Windows Work Group Network."
Microsoft Decision, supra note 213, art. 1(2)
221 Offering a version of Windows without the Media Player involved redesigning
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the purpose of assessing unilateral refusals to deal.222  After a brief
restatement of the relevant case law,223 the Commission concludes that there
is "no persuasiveness to an approach that would advocate the existence of
exhaustive checklist of exceptional circumstances and would have the
Commission disregard a limine other circumstances of exceptional
character that may deserve to be taken into account when assessing a refusal
to supply." 224  Consequently, it said that Microsoft's refusal to supply
interoperability information was abusive because 1) interoperability
information is needed by competitors in the market for work group server
operating systems to "viably stay on the market;" 225 2) Microsoft's conduct
involved a disruption of previous levels of supply; 22 6 3) there was "a risk of
eliminating all competition in the work group server operating system
market"; 227 4) the refusal to supply had the consequence of "preventing
innovation in the work group server market and of diminishing consumers'
choice by locking them into a homogenous Microsoft's solution;" 228 and 5)
the refusal was not objectively justified because on balance "negative
impact of an order to supply on Microsoft's incentives to innovate is
outweighed by its positive impact on the level of innovation of the whole
industry (including Microsoft) .'229
Although the Commission concedes that a refusal to license is not
anticompetitive as such, and that only exceptional circumstances warrant
compulsory licensing, its approach can be fairly characterized as a full-
blown rule of reason analysis. The Commission provides no meaningful
constraints on application of Article 82 to refusals to license by dominant
companies. It applies criteria that were coined by the ECJ in Magill and
IMS in a somehow diluted version. In IMS, the Court ruled that the
requested service must be indispensable for carrying on a particular
business and that it must be likely to exclude all competition in the
downstream market. The Commission considered Microsoft's refusal
abusive because it "puts Microsoft's competitors at a strong competitive
disadvantage, 230 and creates "a risk of eliminating all competition" in the
downstream market. Clearly, it would be very difficult to prove the
likelihood of total foreclosure of a secondary market where, as in Microsoft,
the dominant company holds 60% market share and its rivals have market
222 Microsoft Decision, supra note 213, 550.
223 The Commission quoted both cases involving compulsory licensing (Volvo/Veng and
Magill) and cases where a refusal to deal did not concern IP.
224 Microsoft Decision, supra note 213, 555.
225 Id. 779.
226 Id. 780, 578-84.
227 Id. 781. 585-692.
228 Id. 782, 693-708.
229 Id. 783, 709-78.
230 Id. 589.
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shares of 5-10 %.231 By rejecting Microsoft's assertions that reverse
engineering and the licensing program under the U.S. settlement gives its
rivals the necessary access to interface information, the Commission
weakens the requirement of indispensability. Whereas the compulsory
license will undeniably assist Microsoft's rivals, it is unclear whether it is
essential for them to be able to compete. The Commission only marginally
addresses the new product criterion, 232 probably because Microsoft's rivals
were not able to show that the disclosure of interoperability information
would allow them to make new, different products.
The new balancing test used to assess whether a refusal to license
was justified calls for a highly complex economic analysis, which makes it
difficult to apply233 and gives a high degree of discretion to antitrust
enforcers, which has negative impact on legal certainty. 234  The
Commission's application of the balancing test in Microsoft confirms that
this criticism is valid. The Commission reasoned that a compulsory license
would not lower Microsoft's incentives to innovate. On the contrary,
Microsoft will innovate more once it is faced with competitive pressure.235
Even one of the most ardent advocates of the Commission's balancing test,
231 See also Pardolesi & Renda, supra note 218, at 543-47 (arguing that the market
definition and calculation of market shares in the Microsoft Decision is flawed, and that in
reality, Microsoft's position in the market for server operating systems may not be as
strong as the Commission suggest).
232 The Commission reasoned that lack of interoperability deterred Microsoft's competitors
from developing new products. Microsoft Decision, supra note 213, 694, 700. Professor
Leveque argued that this is sufficient to consider the new product criterion is satisfied. See
Franqois Lveque, Innovation, Leveraging and EssentialFfacilities:Iinteroperability
Licensing in the EU Microsoft Case, 28 WORLD COMPETITION 71, 75 (2005). It will be for
the Court to decide, assuming that Microsoft's interfaces are covered by IPRs and that the
requirement of "new product" is necessary for compulsory licensing, whether such a
speculative statement about the possibility of developing unspecified products by
Microsoft's rivals will be sufficient to satisfy the condition. If that would be the case, this
requirement would be considerably weakened (if not devoid of any significant meaning).
233 See, e.g., Ahlborn, Evans & Padilla, supra note 193, at 1145-46; Ridyard, supra note 9,
at 671.
234 See, e.g., Forrester, supra note 205; Geradin, supra note 9, at 1542-43 But see Lv6que,
supra note 232, at 76-78 (arguing that the Commission's balancing test is correct from an
economic perspective).
An involved Commission official explained "Microsoft's refusal to disclose the
interoperability information was itself reducing the incentives of rivals to bring innovative
products to the market... [Microsoft's rivals] know that however good their products
are.. .they will not be able to compete on the merits simply because Microsoft has reserved
for itself an artificial interoperability advantage. Our remedy will therefore increase the
degree of innovation in the market -with it, rival server vendors will know that it is worth
their while to focus development efforts on innovations in their products...., there will be a
spur to Microsoft's own incentives to innovate, as it will no longer be able to simply rely
on the artificial interoperability advantage to win in the market." Jargen Mensching, The
Microsoft Decision - Promoting Innovation, Sweet & Maxwell 4th Annual Competition
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Professor Lvaque, sees flaws in this argument. 236 He points out that it is
based on an assumption that companies enjoying market power have fewer
incentives to innovate, which is at least controversial.23 v
To my mind the balancing test is flawed, even if we assume that
antitrust authorities and judges have the prophetic skills required to apply it.
The Commission correctly focuses on innovation, the common denominator
by which antitrust and IP should be measured and compared. 238  The
Commission's test, however, fails to account for important factors that have
an effect on the level of innovation. First, the Commission ignores the fact
that forced sharing reduces the incentives of Microsoft's rivals to develop
products competing with the Windows platform. Though arguably forced
sharing will increase the incentives of Microsoft's rivals to compete with
Microsoft on the market for server operating systems, it will also decrease
their incentives to attack Microsoft in the market for PC operating
systems.2 39  Second, the balancing test focuses on the effect of a
compulsory license in a particular market, whereas it will affect the value of
IPRs held by various companies whether or not they compete with
Microsoft.240 In other words, it creates a risk that one day the Commission
will decide that innovation in the market for antiviral drugs would be
spurred if Roche were ordered to license the patent covering Tamiflu®.
Investing in innovation is like buying a lottery ticket. It is reasonable to
infer that fewer people would buy lottery tickets if selected jackpots were
partially confiscated, even if it were to promote some sort of carefully
selected and socially beneficial objective.
The Commission's position about compulsory licensing has been
recently confirmed in the Article 82 Paper.24 1 The document contains a
somewhat modified version of the balancing test. 242 The Commission
seems to treat a refusal to license as a separate type of a refusal to deal, but
236 Lev~que, supra note 232, at 79-80.
237 For example, Timothy F. Bresnahan is of the view that although network effects may
mean that monopolies such as the one of Microsoft's or Intel's may persist for decades, the
monopolists are constantly challenged by potential entrants and mist keep abreast of minor
technological improvements. See Timothy F. Bresnahan, New Modes of Competition:
Implications for the Future Structure of the Computer Industry, in COMPETITION,
INNOVATION, AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE
158-163 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999). On the relation between
market power and innovation see MORTON I. KAMIEN & NANCY L. SCHWARTZ, MARKET
STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION (1982).
238 This is in line with recent scholarship on the subject, See e.g., Michael A. Carrier,
Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761 (2002).
239 For a discussion of the problems concerning economics of interoperability and reverse
engineering see Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of
Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L. J. 1575, 1607-30 (2002).
241 See Elhauge, supra note 11, at 275; Geradin, supra note 9, at 1540.241 The Commission rejects the position that a refusal to license may be abusive only if the
MagillIMS test is met. See Article 82 Paper, supra note 10, 239.242 Id 213, 236.
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comments on it only briefly. 243 One of the interesting issues is the
discussion of the new product criterion. The Commission acknowledges
that "an additional condition may have to be met" when a refusal to license
concerns an IPR.244 This requirement is that "the refusal to grant a license
prevents the development of the market for which the license is an
indispensable input, to the detriment of consumers", which is met only
when the company requesting the license "does not intend to limit itself
essentially to duplicating the goods or services already offered... by the
owner of the IPR, but intends to produce new goods or services not offered
by the owner of the right., 245 The Commission, however, does not stop its
reasoning there and asserts that a refusal to license is abusive also if it
concerns "an IPR protected technology which is indispensable as a basis for
follow-on innovation by competitors". 246 If this interpretation were to be
adopted, the new product test could hardly be seen as any limiting principle
on the refusal to license. Just as in Microsoft, the Commission diluted the
criteria relating to indispensability and foreclosure, and in the Article 82
Paper, it undermines the new product criterion.
The framework proposed by the Commission to tackle the issues at
the intersection of antitrust and IP law creates a risk of over-enforcement
and has negative impact on the incentives to invest in R&D. This danger is
even greater given that EU competition law is now applied also by national
competition authorities that may lack the Commission's expertise and need
clear guidance as to the type of conduct that make a unilateral refusal to
license abusive. This is hardly a hypothetical problem. Only recently, the
Italian antitrust authority found that one of Merck's patents covering a
pharmaceutical product was an essential facility and ordered it to license the
patented compound to a competitor. 247 The French Competition Council
had to rule whether Apple's refusal to license its digital rights management
technology to a competitor in the downstream market for music downloads






247 Decision of 15 June 2005, Case A364, Merck-Principi Attivi, Autorita Garante della
Concorrenza e del Mercato Bulletin, no. 23/2005, 7; see also Alain Georges & Matteo F.
Bay, Essential Facilities: A Doctrine Clearly in Need of Limiting Principles?, 17 INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. L. J. 1 (2005). Merck's patent in question expired in most countries, but not
in Italy. An Italian company requested a license because it wanted to commence
production of the patented compound in Italy for export to other countries.
241 In this case a refusal to license did not give rise to liability under competition law.
Conseil de la Concurrence, Decision No. 04-D-54 du 9 novembre 2004 relative Al des
pratiques mises en ceuvre par la socidt6 Apple Computer, Inc. dans les secteurs du
tdlkchargement de musique sur Internet et des baladeurs numdriques, http://www.conseil-
concurrence.fr/pdf/avis/04d54.pdf. See also Giuseppe Mazziotti, Did Apple's Refusal to
License Proprietary Information enabling Interoperability with its iPod Music Player
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The IMS judgment, Microsoft Decision and the Article 82 Paper
illustrate a sharp disagreement as to the standards applicable to unilateral
refusals to license in Europe. Many fundamental issues have not been
resolved. The Microsoft case is now pending on appeal before the CFI.
Hearings are expected to take place in the spring of 2006. The stakes are
high and it is most likely that the CFI's decision will be appealed to the
ECJ, the EU's highest court. This means it may take a few years until any
firm conclusions can be made about the intersection between IP and
antitrust law in the Europe.
B. AMERICA: THE Focus ON INVALID PATENTS AND SHAM LITIGATION
The application of antitrust law to unilateral conduct involving IPRs
has a long history in America. Claims involving the use of invalid IPRs to
obtain a competitive advantage are what American courts are most likely to
embrace.249 Unlike in Europe, a refusal to license or enforcement of a valid
IPR can hardly give rise to antitrust liability. Although the proposition that
an IPR may constitute an essential facility has not been ruled out,250 U.S.
courts are highly skeptical about applying the essential facilities doctrine to
IP. It has not proven helpful in Intel v. Intergraph.251 In this case, Intel cut
off the supply of microprocessors and proprietary information to Intergraph,
one of its customers, as the retaliatory measure for the latter's attempt to
enforce its IPRs against Intel and its other customers. Intergraph claimed,
among other things, that Intel's chips and technical knowledge were so vital
for its interests that they constituted an essential facility and that they
should be licensed on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. The District
Court agreed and granted a preliminary injunction that obliged Intel to
supply Intergraph with the relevant Intel product information and
microprocessors. 252  The Federal Court reversed the decision. In the
Court's view the essential facilities doctrine can be applied only if there is a
competitive relationship between the company controlling the facility and
Constitute an Abuse under Article 82 of the EC Treaty, 28 WORLD COMPETITION 253
(2005).
249 "By far the most common allegations relating to IP concern the allegedly improper
acquisition or enforcement of an IP right, which act is commonly claimed to be in
furtherance of monopolization or attempted monopolization." I HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra
note 35, 11.1.
25' Bell South Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelly Info Publ'g Inc, 719 F. Supp. 1551, 1566
(S.D. Fla. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1436 (1 th Cir. 1993) is cited as a case
suggesting that information and other intangibles could constitute an essential facilities.
See 1 HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, 13.3c2; James B. Kobak, Jr., Intellectual Property,
Refusals to Deal and the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 832 PLI/P at 385.
251 Intergraph Corp. v. Intel. Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
252 Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998).
50
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 9 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol9/iss1/2
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
the company requesting the access.2 53  Since Intel did not compete with
Intergraph in the downstream market for workstations, the essential
facilities doctrine did not apply. The Court was skeptical about the claim
that the refusal to supply proprietary information was anticompetitive.
Even though it was established that Intel's withholding proprietary
information lacked business justification, it was not established that Intel's
behavior contributed to creating, maintaining or enlarging Intel's
dominance. 254 The Court squarely rejected the leveraging theory, again on
the ground that no harm to competition in the downstream market was
established.255  Interestingly, the government also challenged Intel's
conduct, but on different grounds and with more success. The FTC alleged
that Intel maintained its monopoly power by denying or threatening to deny
technical information about Intel microprocessors to Intel customers who
have developed and patented innovations in microprocessor technology, as
a means of coercing these customers into granting royalty-free licenses to
their innovations to Intel.256  The FTC alleged a pattern of conduct that
helped Intel to maintain its monopoly by discouraging leapfrogging
innovations.2 57 The case ended with a consent decree in which Intel agreed
not to cease dealing with companies merely because they sued to enforce
their IPRs. The essential facilities doctrine was not invoked. The FTC
stressed that the remedy imposed was not compulsory licensing, 258 and that
253 Intergraph Corp. v. Intel. Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Court's
reasoning suggested, however, that essential facilities doctrine could be applied to IPRs.
254 Id. at 1358-59.
255 Id. at 1359-60.
256 See FTC Complaint, In re Intel Corp., No 9288 11 (filed June 8, 1998), at
http://www.flc.gov/os/1998/06/intelcmp.pdf. The FTC alleged in particular that when
Digital Equipment Corporation, Intergraph Corporation and Compaq Computer
Corporation, companies that hold important patents on microprocessor and related
technologies, sought to enforce those patents against Intel or other computer companies
who buy Intel products, Intel retaliated by cutting off the necessary technical information
and threatening to cut off the supply of microprocessors. For a comment on Intel's case
see I HOVENKAMP ET. AL. supra note 35, 13.4d; Maureen A. O'Rourke, Striking a
Delicate Balance: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, Contract, and Standardization in the
Computer Industry, 12 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 11-23 (1998).
257 See I HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 35, 13.4d.
258 The FTC stated that "[t]he The Proposed Order does not impose any kind of broad
"compulsory licensing" regime upon Intel. So long as it is otherwise lawful, Intel is free to
decide in the first instance whether it chooses to provide or not provide information to
customers, and whether to provide more information or earlier information to specific
customers in furtherance of a joint venture or other legitimate activity. Moreover, the Order
is limited to the types of information that Intel routinely gives to customers to enable them
to use Intel microprocessors, not information that would be used to design or manufacture
microprocessors in competition with Intel." See FTC, Analysis of Proposed Consent Order
to Aid Public Comment, http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 1999/03/dO9288intelanalysis.htm.
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Intel was entitled to withhold its IP from rivals planning to compete directly
with Intel's monopoly product.
259
An attempt to apply the essential facilities doctrine to IP was also
rebuffed in Aldridge.260  Aldridge was a seller of a disk cache computer
program. Microsoft effectively preempted its market by including such a
program in its new version of Windows (Windows 95). In addition, when
Microsoft's operating system detected Aldridge's software, it displayed a
series of message alerts, warning that Aldridge's software decreased system
performance and advising that it should be removed. Aldridge argued that
Windows was an essential facility and that Microsoft's behavior effectively
excluded Aldridge from the market. The Court found that the essential
facility doctrine could not apply in this case. First, it held that Windows
was not essential. The disc cache program relied upon an imperfection in
the design of Microsoft's software and its sole purpose was to overcome
these imperfections and improve system performance. All Microsoft did
was design a new version of Windows which remedied this imperfection.
The Court reasoned that "Microsoft's operating systems are essential to
Aldridge only to the extent that the systems operate less efficiently" and
that it should not be punished for improving its own product since "antitrust
laws do not require a competitor to maintain archaic or outdated
technology; even monopolists may improve their products." 261 The
essential facilities doctrine could not be relied on because, unlike other
essential facilities cases, Aldridge did not involve a natural monopoly or a
state-supported one.
Some American commentators argue that the existence of IPRs by
themselves is sufficient justification for a refusal to license,262 while others
see the scope for antitrust intervention in only very limited
circumstances. 263 The idea that a unilateral refusal to license could give rise
to antitrust liability also did not travel well in U.S. courts. The Federal
Circuit in In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation
264
took the position that a unilateral refusal to license a valid IPR was per se
259 In an earlier case, the FTC explicitly recognized that a refusal to license IPRs providing
a competitive advantage to direct competitors could not, as such, violate antitrust laws (In
the Matter of E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 206-07 (Oct. 20, 1980)).
260 David L. Aldridge Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 995 F. Supp. 728 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
261 Id. at 753.
262 See, e.g., See I HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 35, 13.3c2, 13.3d4; Lipsky & J.
Sidak, supra note 77, at 1218-19; Paul D. Marquard & Mark Leddy, The Essential
Facilities Doctrine and Intellectual Property Rights: A Response to Pitosky, Patterson and
Hooks, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 847, 859-63 (2003); Elhauge, supra note 11, at 300-05.
263 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentee's Market Power Without
Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive
Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REv. 985 (1999); Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson & Jonathan
Hooks, The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J.
443, 452-54 (2003).
264In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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legal, unless the case involved tying or sham litigation. In this case, the
Independent Service Organizations (ISOs) sued Xerox, claiming that its
refusal to sell patented parts and copyrighted manuals and to license
copyrighted software violated antitrust laws. Xerox counterclaimed that
ISOs infringed patents covering Xerox's machines' parts and copyrights in
Xerox's service drawings. The Court asserted that a dominant company
had no obligation to license its IP and that there was "no reported case in
which a court has imposed antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to
license." 265 It concluded that "[i]n the absence of any indication of illegal
tying, fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the
patent holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the claimed invention free from liability under the
antitrust laws."
266
Other Circuit Courts that dealt with similar cases adopted a strong
but rebuttable presumption that a refusal to license is legal. In Data Gen.
267Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., the First Circuit refused to
immunize refusals to license from antitrust scrutiny.268  Data General
stopped supplying its copyrighted diagnostic software to ISOs repairing
Data General's computer hardware with the aim to increase its sales in the
aftermarket. ISOs used the software without permission and Data General
sued for copyright infringement. ISOs, relying on Aspen, counterclaimed
that cutting off the supply of software violated §2 of the Sherman Act. The
Court took the view that neither antitrust nor IP should be given primacy
one over each other. It found that "an author's desire to exclude others
from use of its copyrighted work is presumptively valid business
justification for any immediate harm to consumers." 269 The presumption
could be rebutted by evidence that the monopolist acquired the protection of
the IP laws in an unlawful manner. 270  The Court found no antitrust
violation because, unlike in Aspen, there was no competitive market prior to
Data General's refusal to license its diagnostic software. The Ninth Circuit
took a somewhat different route in Kodak.271 The case, just as the other two
cases discussed above, concerned a refusal to supply patented spare parts to
ISOs. Kodak, however, claimed that its refusal to deal was justified by IP
only towards the end of the litigation. The Ninth Circuit, referring to Data
General, held that "while exclusionary conduct can include a monopolist's
unilateral refusal to license a [patent or] copyright," or to sell its patented or
copyrighted work, a monopolist's "desire to exclude others from its
[protected] work is a presumptively valid business justification for any
265 Id. at 1326.
266 Id. at 1327.
267 Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
2 6 8 Id. at 1184-87.
2 6 9 Id. at 1187.
270 Id. at 1188.
271 Image Tech. Serv. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
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immediate harm to consumers." 272 Unlike the First Circuit, however, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that the evidence of a pretext could rebut the
presumption. Ultimately, the Court found that the presumption did not
apply and upheld the jury's finding that Kodak's refusal to supply ISOs
violated §2 of the Sherman Act.
The scope for antitrust intervention has been further limited by
Trinko. In NYMEX, 271 the Intercontinental Exchange ("ICE") developed an
on-line Internet-based exchange to compete against the New York
Mercantile Exchange ("NYMEX"), the world's largest exchange for the
trading of physical commodity futures contracts and options on those
commodity contracts. NYMEX operated as an "open outcry" system,
whereby traders transact with each other by physical communications on a
physical trading "floor". It also acts as a clearinghouse for all the
commodity futures contracts and options traded over its exchange. The
settlement prices have gained a status of the market prices for the
underlying commodities. They are used as benchmarks in transactions
executed outside of NYMEX. NYMEX is statutorily obliged to report its
settlement prices, among other data, to the public. It makes them available
to the public on an almost instantaneous basis by reporting them on its
website and by distributing them to subscribers. The data obtained on real-
time basis by subscribers was made available subject to the condition that it
could not be used in competition with NYMEX. ICE entered the market for
executing the trades and was effectively forced to rely on NYMEX's
settlement prices. NYMEX, allegedly to eliminate competition from ICE in
the electronic trading market, sued ICE for violating NYMEX's copyright
in the settlement prices. ICE counterclaimed that NYMEX's refusal to
supply the data constituted a violation of §2 of the Sherman Act. Relying
on Trinko, the court found that the facts did not come within the Aspen
exception or within the essential facilities doctrine. The essential facilities
doctrine did not apply because ICE had some access to the data and because
the scope of access was subject to sectoral regulation. The Aspen exception
was unavailable because ICE and NYMEX had no prior history of previous
dealings. Thus, there was no indication that NYMEX was foregoing short-
term profits by refusing to cooperate with ICE. The Court held that
NYMEX has a legitimate business interest in preventing ICE from
freeriding on its settlement prices.274 Though competitive concerns posed
by this case were not addressed by application of antitrust rules, the NYMEX
272 Id. at 1218.
273 New York Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinental Exch., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 559
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
274 For comment on the NYMEX case, see Eleanor M. Fox, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions and
an Orphan Case: Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and Refusals to Deal, 28 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 952, 959-61. (2005)
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court found the remedy in copyright law.2 75 It dismissed NYMEX's claim
for copyright infringement and related IP claims. The settlement prices
were non-copyrightable words or short phrases. Moreover, the merger
doctrine precluded copyright protection for the settlement prices, as
NYMEX's idea of settlement price and fact of settlement price used by
market participants could not be distinguished from its expression.
276
The U.S. courts see a very narrow, if any, scope for application of
antitrust laws to a unilateral refusal to license a valid IPR. The spare parts
cases, in which the Circuit Courts got closest to condemning unilateral
refusals to license, are more properly characterized as tying than refusal to
license cases. 277 The majority of American courts refused to find unilateral
refusals to license illegal, even if the refusal had an anticompetitive purpose
or effect.2 78  Yet, it is wrong to assume that IP owners engaging in
anticompetitive behavior are immune from the scrutiny of U.S. antitrust
laws. Courts have often found IP-owners guilty of exclusionary practices,
particularly under § 1 of the Sherman act if they tied an unpatented product
with the patented one.279 §2 of the Sherman Act has also been frequently
used to address concerns relating to improper acquisition or enforcement of
intellectual property rights. 280  In Walker Process Equipment v. Food
Machinery & Chemical,28' the patentee brought a suit for patent
infringement against a competitor. The competitors counterclaimed that the
patent at issue was obtained by defrauding the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO)282 and that patent enforcement in this situation was an attempt to
monopolize. The Supreme Court held that the proof that a patent was
obtained by knowingly and willfully misrepresenting facts to the PTO
"would be sufficient to strip owner of its exemption from the antitrust
laws." 283 In such a case, §2 of the Sherman Act could be infringed, if the
other elements necessary to establish a §2 violation are present. Fraudulent
procurement of a patent is not itself an antitrust violation. There must also
an antitrust injury manifested in adverse effects on consumer welfare. 284 In
particular, there must be an attempt to enforce such patent or to use it in an
27' New York Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinental Exch,, Inc., 389 F.Supp.2d 527
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
276 Id. at 541-43.
277 See I HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 35, 13.3d4.278 Id. 12.3d1.
279 See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942).
280 It has been pointed out that whether very few cases relating to unilateral refusals to
license are brought before the U.S. courts, there are many reported decisions concerning
these issues. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 35, 11.1.
21 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
212 In this case the patentee filed a sworn statement in the PTO that it neither knew nor
believed that invention had been used in the United States prior to the filling of the patent
application. In fact, the patentee itself had used the patent publicly, prior to the filling of
the patent application.
283 Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177.
284 FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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anticompetitive manner. 285 The application of the Walker Process doctrine
requires a high standard of proof, in particular with respect to the willful
286fraud on the PTO. The enforcement of an IPR that, while not obtained
by fraud, is known by its owner at the time of enforcement to be invalid,
unenforceable, or not to be infringed may also constitute an antitrust
violation. In Hangards,287 the Ninth Circuit held that bringing patent
infringement suits against rivals in such situations can be a §2 violation. In
this case, the patent was obtained in good faith, but the patentee knew
before filling the patent infringement suit that its patent was invalid. Filing
an IP infringement suit against someone that is known by the IP holder not
to infringe his IPR may also give rise to liability under §2 of the Sherman
Act. To be sure, an IP holder does not violate antitrust laws merely because
it brings an enforcement suit on a novel question. The lawsuit must be
objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could
realistically expect success on the merits.
288
Situations involving sham litigation or the use of invalid IP rights
present probably the clearest case for antitrust intervention. It could hardly
be said that using antitrust laws in such cases undermines the objectives of
IP laws or may have negative effects on the incentives to innovate.
Attempts to enforce invalid IPRs undermine the objectives of both IP and
antitrust laws. Thus, it is surprising that EU competition law only recently
has been used for the first time to address this type of anticompetitive
conduct.
2 89
The U.S. antitrust enforcers have noted a number of anticompetitive
concerns resulting from patent policy. The FTC's Report To Promote
Innovation: the Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Policy290
285 See I HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 35, 11.2e, 11.4a.
286 Id. I 1.2f.
217 Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979).
288 Prof 1 Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60
(1993); see also 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 35, 11.3b.
2" Last year the Commission adopted a decision in AstraZeneca case (Commission
Decision in case COMP/37.507 - Generics/Astra Zeneca), the first case in which Article 82
has been applied to alleged abuse of patent procedures. The Commission found that
AstraZeneca, a pharmaceutical company, infringed Article 82 of the EC Treaty by
misusing pubic procedures and regulations in a number of EU Member States which
allowed it to extend patent protection for its anti-ulcer drug Losec and exclude generic
firms from the market. A possible reason for leaving Walker Process type of cases outside
the scope of antitrust intervention could be the distinction between existence and exercise
of IPRs, which guided application of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty to national
intellectual property right. Under this doctrine, EU competition law did not interfere with
the existence and grant of IPRs, but only limited the way IP holders were able to exercise
their rights. Arguably, this distinction has been abandoned in more recent ECJ's
jurisprudence. See also Nikas Fagerlund & Soren Bo Rasmussen, AstraZeneca:Tthe First
Abuse in the Pharmaceutical Sector, COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL., No.3, 2005, at 54.
290 Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of
Competition Law and Patent Policy (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter FTC Report], ch. 2,
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/ 10/cpreport.htm.
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confirms that more has to be done to strike the right balance between IP and
antitrust laws. The most recent policy statement from the U.S. antitrust
agency suggests that this time it is not antitrust but IP policy that is at odds
with mainstream economics. The FTC is particularly concerned with the
quality of the patents issued by the PTO. The Report identifies a number of
undesirable consequences resulting from existence of questionable patents
such as deterring entry by imposing additional costs, either by royalties or
litigation.291 Unwarranted patents may be difficult to eliminate because in
many cases firms lack the incentives to engage in litigation, as the cost of
obtaining a license is smaller than the potential litigation costs. In
industries with incremental innovation, such as the software industry, they
contribute to defensive patenting and dramatic increases in transaction
costs. The Report provides apt evidence of "patent stacking" and "patent
thickets" in certain industries.292 Uncertainty as to the validity of patents
issued by PTO and their scope aggravates the situation.293 The FTC makes
several recommendations to improve patent quality and minimize
anticompetitive costs of the patent system. The Report is also an appeal to
incorporate economic considerations in patent policy. Notably, the FTC
declares that antitrust policy cannot remedy all competitive concerns. The
FTC warns that overeager enforcement of antitrust laws may reduce
incentives to innovate. The FTC stresses that identifying anticompetitive
conduct involving IP requires thorough understanding of the efficiencies
that businesses may legitimately realize through particular types of patent-
related conduct and the role of patents in innovation and competition in
particular industries. 294
The Report and the case law analyzed above point to the conclusion
that, unlike their European counterparts, U.S. antitrust enforcers see little
scope for antitrust policy to mitigate the consequences of imperfect IP
policies. They are reluctant to intervene in what is perceived to be the
sphere of IP policy and take the view that any competitive concerns are
better remedied by changes in the IP policy. This trend corresponds with
shielding antitrust policy away from fields occupied by other forms of
regulation. Exactly the opposite tendencies are present in EU competition
291 FTC Report, supra note 290, ch. 5. The consequences of uncertainty were identified as
difficulties in business planning and raising capital, increased investment risk and
disruptions in negotiating licenses.
292 This is in particularly an important issue in the field of computer hardware industry.
Patent proliferation and defensive patenting gave rise to patent thickets that are harmful for
innovation by diverting the R&D money to obtaining and maintaining defensive patent
portfolios and negotiating licenses from numerous patent holders. Defensive patenting was
also considered to accelerate in the software industry, and panelists explained that it was
used to maintain detente with rivals, to obtain the necessary patent portfolio in order to
enter into cross-licensing agreements and to be used as a shield in case of an infringement
suit by a rival. See FTC Report, supra note 290, ch. 3; Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 151.
293 FTC Report, supra note 290, ch. 5.
294 FTC Report, supra note 290, ch. 1.
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law. Both the European Commission and the ECJ seem to see a role for
competition law to correct improvidently defined IPRs, even if it entails
adjusting competition principles. It may seem reasonable, as unlike
competition policy, most issues relating to IP policy within the European
Union are still decided at the national level.295 Yet, there is an inherent
danger in this approach. It may lead antitrust authorities to adopt
analytically questionable approaches that undermine the coherence of
antitrust law. Competition agencies must be particularly cautious in
adopting measures to curb IP laws, as they may discourage the efficient
creation and exploitation of IPRs.296  The European Commission's
proposals concerning application of competition law to interoperability
information confirm that these reservations are valid. This issue is the
subject of the following section.
C. SHOULD THERE BE SPECIAL RULES FOR INTEROPERABILITY
INFORMATION? AND WHY MICROSOFT WAS INEVITABLE
The Article 82 Paper sheds new light on the Commission's stance as
to compulsory licensing in the context of IT. The Paper's chapter dealing
with refusals to deal contains a separate section entitled "[r]efusal to supply
information needed for interoperability". The Commission classifies a
refusal to supply proprietary information that allows a dominant company
"to extend its dominance from one market to another" 297 as a separate
offense from a refusal to license an IPR. The Commission acknowledges
that interoperability information may be covered by trade secrecy, but
reasons that it "may not be appropriate to apply to such refusals to supply
information the same high standards for intervention as those [applicable to
refusals to license an IPR]." 298 The Commission acknowledges "there is no
general obligation even for dominant companies to ensure interoperability."
However, a refusal to supply interoperability information may be abusive, if
1) interoperability information is controlled by a dominant company; 2) it is
necessary for interoperability between one market and other; and 3) the
refusal is a means to leverage market power from one market to another. 299
The Commission does not specify whether, as one could expect, a refusal to
provide interoperability information must also create foreclosure in a
secondary market. Neither the new product nor objective justification
criteria are discussed. It is unclear whether refusal to supply is "a special
case" whether or not the requested interoperability information is covered
295 IP laws have been harmonized to some degree during the last 20 years, but still there are
no EU-wide patents or copyrights, as it is the case in the U.S.
296 Kovacic & Reindl, supra note 160, at 1066-68.
297 See Article 82 Paper, supra note 10, 241. The Commission characterizes a refusal to
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by IPRs other than trade secrets. In any case, a refusal to provide
interoperability information may be a very serious violation of EU
competition law, potentially resulting in multi-million dollar fines.
300
Three observations can be made about the Commission's views on a
refusal to supply interoperability information: 1) the Commission sees a
larger scope for antitrust intervention in regulating access to knowledge in
high technology industries. The specific reference to interoperability
information indicates that the Commission would not apply the same rules
to patented plugs or other parts that allow connecting physical objects, even
though similar competitive concerns may arise in such cases; 2) the
Commission treats leveraging as a separate antitrust offense, at least in the
context of the IT sector; and 3) the Commission thinks that trade secrets are
less worthy of protection than other forms of IP. I will limit myself here to
the first two implications of the "interoperability offense".
The "interoperability offense" must be analyzed in the light of the
Microsoft Decision. Yet, Microsoft is not the first case in which the
Commission alleged that a dominant company refused to supply
interoperability information. There has been a series of developments in
EU competition law of which Microsoft is a grand finale. Microsoft bears
striking resemblance to the IBM case settled some twenty years ago. 301 Just
as in Microsoft, IBM concerned bundling and non-disclosure of interface
information. In the 1970s, IBM began bundling peripheral equipment
control functions into mainframe hardware in response to increasing
competition from "plug-compatible" manufacturers. 30 2  It also changed
from its full disclosure policy to keeping operating system software source
code secret, limiting and delaying interface disclosures. This prompted
U.S. antitrust authorities to commence an investigation into IBM's practices.
IBM's strategy was also challenged in the U.S. Courts, which firmly
rejected the claim that IBM may be under duty to provide its competitors
with secret information concerning the architecture of its products.303 The
government monopolization case was eventually voluntarily withdrawn
300 Microsoft Decision, supra note 213, 1065, 1068. A fine for a "very serious
infringement" of Article 82 is likely to be above EUR 20 million.
301 IBM Undertaking, 3 COMMON MARKET L REV. 147 (1984); see also Forrester, supra
note 126.
301 Some companies built peripheral equipment (tape storage drives, disc drives, and add-
on memory units) that plugged into the standard interfaces used on IBM System 360 and
then System 370 mainframes. IBM also faced competition from main frame producers
whose computers could be used interchangeably with IBM computers and were cheaper.
303 See, e.g, Memorex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs Corp. 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980);
California Computer Products, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs Corp. 613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir.
1979); see also Telex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs Corp. 510 F.2d 894, 931-32 (10th Cir.
1975). Along the same lines, in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263
(2d Cir. 1979), it was held that Kodak did not have a duty to pre-disclose information about
its new amateur camera system to its competitors in the film and photographic supplies
market sp they can compete with Kodak when the new system is released.
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following submission of all the evidence. Thus, it has been firmly
established that a refusal to make technology compatible, in the absence of
a purpose to create or maintain monopoly and assuming legitimate business
purposes, does not create an antitrust problem.
30 4
This, however, was not the end of the IBM case. It continued in
Europe, where the Commission commenced an investigation following
complaints from IBM competitors. Eventually a settlement was reached.
IBM undertook to license the interface information sufficient to allow
hardware and software manufacturers to design their products so that they
can be used with System370, the then most powerful range of computers
manufactured by IBM. IBM was also required to support international
standards for open system interconnection for products, systems, and
networks of different manufacturers. 30 5  This was the first time in the
history of EU competition law where a unilateral refusal to license was
attacked and a compulsory license imposed as a remedy. The case is
significant also for another reason: it inspired the provisions of the EU
Software Directive that allow decompilation of computer programs when it
is necessary to obtain interoperability information. 30 6  Article 6 of the
Directive provides for a limited right to reverse engineer proprietary
software to obtain interoperability information; it does not oblige copyright
holders to disclose relevant interface information that is necessary to
achieve interoperability. Article 9(1) of the Directive nullifies license terms
forbidding decompilation of computer programs to achieve interoperability.
The Article 82 Paper suggests however that the Commission considers that
the duties of dominant companies in this respect may go as far as to provide
interoperability information to their competitors and support open
standards. Indeed, in Magill, the Commission suggested that a compulsory
licensing case would be beneficial as a precedent in the field of computer
software. 30 7 The Microsoft case and the Article 82 Paper confirm that the
Commission's policy goes in this direction. An additional observation is
due here. Microsoft and now also the Article 82 Paper, just as IMS and
Magill, touch upon the controversial field of IP. The arguments concerning
the proper construction of the Software Directive and whether or not the
interface information Microsoft was requested to supply is protected by
IPRs belong to the key issues in the Microsoft litigation. It is not only the
problem of trade secrets, as the Commission seemed to notice in the Article
82 Paper, but also the scope of other types of IPRs that may cover
interoperability information.
304 David Balto & Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and High-Tech Industries: The New
Challenge, 606 PLI/P at 513, 529-30.
305 IBM Undertaking, supra note 301; see also Abbott T. Lipsky, To the Edge: Maintaining
Incentives for Innovation after the Global Antitrust Explosions, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 521,
537-39 (2004).
306 Forrester, supra note 126.
307 Opinion of A.G. Gulmann in Magill, 1991 E.C.R. 11-485, 136.
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Arguably, there are reasons that support the proposition that the IT
industry requires a higher degree of antitrust scrutiny. The sector is
characterized by extensive vertical integration and network effects.
Network effects can constitute a significant barrier to entry and lead to a
collective lock-in of an established technology.30 8  Yet the speed of
technological change and the market dynamics in the IT sector make the
latter less of a candidate for antitrust intervention. The key question seems
to be how to address the problems stemming from the existence of a
monopolist that controls a de facto industry standard. A radical proposal,
which seems to be advocated by the Commission, is to insist on extensive
opening of access to valuable bottlenecks. Should competing software
manufacturers be allowed to benefit from the network effects generated by
the company who has been the first mover in the market? As the Microsoft
case illustrates, "open access" is not necessarily a panacea. First, it involves
the daunting questions relating to the circumstances that warrant forcing a
dominant company to give access to interoperability information and setting
the terms of such access. 30 9 Though there is a possibility of a lock-in, the
software market is generally dynamic and driven by technological change.
The timing, scope and conditions of access are crucial, if it is to improve
competitive conditions on the market. Second, open access favors intra-
system competition over inter-system competition. Several commentators
noted that whereas it is not clear whether antitrust should be concerned with
intra-system competition, protecting inter-system competition is crucial in
the context of new technologies.
310
As to leveraging, the concept has no precise definition. The claim
that a monopolist may use its market power in one market to "leverage" a
monopoly into another is controversial from an economic perspective.
311
308 On economics of high-tech markets see, for example, Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro,
Antitrust in Software Markets, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT
MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 29 (Eisenach & Lenard, eds.,
1998); Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust at the Millennium (Part II): Challenges of the New
Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST
L. J. 913 (2001); and Richard A. Posner, Antitrust at the Millennium (Part II): Antitrust in
the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925 (2001).
309 One difficulty is the precise definition of "interface." This gave rise to a dispute
between Microsoft and the Commission on the implementation of the Microsoft Decision.
European Commission, "Competition: Commission sends new letter to Microsoft on
compliance with decision", Press Release No. IP/06/298 of March 10, 2006, available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference-IP/06/298&format-HTML&a
ged-0&language-EN&guiLanguage-en; see generally JONATHAN BAND & MASANOBU
KATOH, INTERFACES ON TRIAL: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTEROPERABILITY IN THE
GLOBAL SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 6-7 (1995).
311 On this point, see Balto & Pitofsky, supra note 306; Pardolesi & Renda, supra note 218,
at 552; and Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 239, at 1615-26.
311 Cf AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, 652; BORK, supra note 52, at 372-74;
Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515
(1985); L~veque, supra note 232, at 80-82; Posner, surpa note 36, 929; Michael H. Riordan
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The Chicago School has attacked the idea that monopoly power could be
extended into a neighboring market with great vehemence. Though a
monopolist may be able to use its market power to force consumers to buy
products it offers in another competitive market, any supra-competitive
profit obtained in the second market would have to be offset by lower prices
in the monopolized market. Though such strategy may harm competitors in
the secondary market, it is unlikely that it will harm consumers absent
predation, which is unlikely. On the contrary, vertical integration may be
the source of efficiency gains, from which consumers also benefit. 12 When
it is unlikely that a secondary market will not be monopolized, the
leveraging in fact is good for consumers and should not be a concern of
antitrust policy.313 Recent economic literature suggests that integration into
a second market may give rise to competitive concerns under certain
circumstances. A monopolist may want to take over a complementary
market in an attempt to defend its existing monopoly against perceived
competitive threats. This may raise barriers to entry, as the entrant would
have to attack the monopolist in two markets at the same time.314 Denying
interoperability information to competitors in the neighboring market may
also help raise the profits of the monopolist, by impairing rivals' ability to
compete in this market.315  Considering these observations, refusal to
provide interoperability information is anticompetitive, if the dominant
company is likely to succeed in obtaining a monopoly in the downstream
market. 316  Dominant companies should not be forced to share
& Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63
ANTITRUST L. J. 513..
312 Posner, supra note 36, at 929.313 See, e.g., Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536, 549 (9th Cir. 1991) (pointing
out that leverage activity may tend to undermine monopoly power, just like monopoly
pricing); Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993) (holding conduct of a
single firm unlawful under § 2 only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens
to do so; finding of an attempt to monopolize requires market inquiry and cannot be based
solely on the existence of "unfair" or "predatory" tactics); 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 18, 652; Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, supra note 55, 317-18;. Both in
Bronner and in IMS, the ECJ required the proof that a refusal to deal leads to elimination of
competition in the downstream market.
314 For an analysis of the dynamic two-level entry theory see, for example, Timothy J.
Murris, Is Heightened Antitrust Scrutiny Appropriate for Software Markets, in
COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL
MARKETPLACE 95-97 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard, eds., 1998).
315 Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, Access and Bundling in High-Technology
Market, in, COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN
THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 108 (JEFFREY A. EISENACH & THOMAS M. LENARD, EDS.
1998). Leveraging theory played a significant role in the U.S. government case against
Microsoft. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET. AL., supra note 35, 10.3b4.
316 The Commission itself suggests that a conduct of a dominant company may be abusive
only if "a likely market distorting foreclosure effect may be established" and that a refusal
to supply in general may be abusive when there is a vertical foreclosure. See Article 82
Paper, supra note 10, 58, 72.
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interoperability information solely because they enter a neighboring market.
If that were the case, competition law would discourage innovation by
monopolists. Yet, the language used in the "interoperability section"
suggests that the Commission stops short of adopting a presumption that a
refusal to supply interoperability information by a dominant company is
abusive. It reasons that "it may not be appropriate to apply to [refusals to
provide interoperability information] the same high standards for
intervention as those [applicable to refusals to license]. 3 17  These
announcements of the Commission's position already encouraged new
complaints alleging that a refusal to provide interoperability information is
invalid.
A refusal to provide interoperability information may be abusive for
exactly the same reasons as a refusal to license. It can be anticompetitive
only if the requested information is indispensable and the refusal leads to
foreclosure in the neighboring market, and where there is no objective
justification for such refusal. In most cases competing companies will be
able to reverse engineer the product and make their products compatible, so
the information at stake must be indispensable to avoid frivolous antitrust
claims. Just as in an abusive refusal to license, it may result in compulsory
sharing of valuable proprietary information. Moreover, some types of
product interfaces may be patentable and in the computer industry,
copyrights protect the source code of APIs, though it remains unclear
whether APIs themselves are protected by copyrights. Thus, limiting
principles are as necessary as in the case of other refusals to license. There
seems to be no good reason why a refusal to provide interoperability
information should be a "special case" in light of the rather flexible
approach that the Commission adopted with respect to refusals to license
and its broad reading of the new product criterion. 318 This can only create
more uncertainty about the standards applicable to refusals to deal in
Europe.
CONCLUSIONS
It is striking that although Americans historically have been more
concerned with the concentration of market power, it is Europeans who
nowadays tend to interfere more with it. Americans were traditionally
suspicious of combinations and monopolies that limited rivalry on the
market. More recently, however, the effectiveness of antitrust intervention
to regulate monopolies has been questioned. There has also been a trend to
shield trade regulation away from industrial policy. These developments
have been matched by the decrease in the scope for antitrust intervention
under § 2 of the Sherman Act. A growing concern that antitrust
317 Article 82 Paper, supra note 10, 242
311 See supra, Section 4.2.2.
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intervention may distort the objectives of the IP system has further limited
the application of antitrust law to unilateral conduct involving IPRs.
Europeans have traditionally been much more comfortable with
concentrations of power through big governments and nationalized
industries.319  They have also been more confident that specific market
failures can be remedied by antitrust intervention.320 To be sure, this has
had a significant bearing on the duties of dominant companies to share their
IP. However, it seems that above all, unlike U.S. antirust law, EU
competition law has been applied to correct imperfections in IP laws in the
same way it has been applied to remedy imperfections in national sectoral
regulation. The European cases discussed above targeted improvidently
defined IPRs. Volvo/Veng involved industrial designs and copyrights
covering spare parts, a right whose scope was controversial at the point
Volvo/Veng was decided. At stake in Magill was a copyright over TV
listings. In IMS, the Commission targeted anticompetitive effects of an
overly broad database right that conferred substantial market power on a
database producer. The asset at stake was a modified version of a postal
code grid. Microsoft involved difficult questions concerning access to
interoperability information. It is unfortunate that the Court provided no
guidance as to how much the value of IP at stake influenced its reasoning.
Application of antitrust principles to curb improvidently defined or granted
IPRs creates a dangerous caveat. In the pursuit of equilibrium between IP
and antitrust law, European enforcers have embraced theories that may have
led to a desirable outcome in a particular case but are unsuitable to serve as
a general rule. More guidance as to the applicable standards is necessary,
particularly now that national antitrust authorities and courts apply Article
82 separate from the European Commission and EU courts. Relying on
essential facilities theory to cure flaws in the IP system creates a risk of
over-enforcement and deterring investment in innovation when the same
principles are to be applied for example to patents covering pharmaceutical
products, as it has recently been the case in Italy. If these issues are not
addressed, application of EU competition law to IP may undermine the
Commission's efforts to develop a framework for innovation policy that
would strengthen the innovation process and increase private R&D
319 It has been also pointed out that at least in the beginning of the EU's existence, the
enforcement of antitrust laws against the type of behavior traditionally seen as
anticompetitive, such as cartels, has not been very strong. The focus was predominantly on
market integration. The European Commission was much more rigorous (by comparison
with American decisions) about conduct that resulted in geographical division of the
market. See, e.g., GIULIANO AMATO, ANTITRUST AND THE BOUNDS OF POWER: THE
DILEMMA OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN THE HISTORY OF THE MARKET 43-45 (1997); Claus
D. Ehlermann, The Contribution of EC Competition Policy to the Single Market, 29
COMMON MARKET L REV. 257 (1992).
320 AMATO, supra note 319, at 65-66.
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spending in the EU.32 1  Hopefully the EU Courts will clarify what the
limiting principles in the Microsoft litigation are. It is also desirable that
they explain how much bearing the value of IP had on the EU compulsory
licensing cases. Last but not least, the compulsory licensing cases in
Europe show that there is a need for more coordination between IP and
antitrust policy makers.
321 See generally European Commission, Communication of 11 March 2003, Innovation
policy: updating the Union's approach in the context of the Lisbon strategy" COM(2003)
112 (final, not published in the Official Journal).
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